

Current History

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

The Far East In The Free World

THE TWO CHINAS	G. F. Hudson	1
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	Arthur H. Dean	7
JAPAN: ALLY FOR PEACE	Harold S. Quigley	15
KOREA: PARTNER FOR FREEDOM?	Channing Liem	20
INDONESIA: SEARCH FOR STABILITY	Justus M. van der Kroef	25
VIETNAM: OUR OUTPOST IN ASIA	Thomas E. Ennis	33
NEW BOOKS ON ASIA	Genevieve C. Linebarger	40
RECEIVED AT OUR DESK		44
MAP OF SOUTHEAST ASIA		32
WORLD DOCUMENTS		
The Statement of the Baghdad Pact Council		49
Dissolution of the Cominform		51
French-Tunisian Agreement		52
Tito-Mollet Communiqué		53
FOCUS ON SINGAPORE		54
THE MONTH IN REVIEW		55

Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times
Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

JULY, 1956
Volume 31 Number 179

Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Editorial Assistant:

JOAN L. BARKON

Promotion Consultant

MARY A. MEEHAN

Contributing Editors

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

ALZADA COMSTOCK

Mt. Holyoke College

PHILIP D. CURTIN

Swarthmore College

DAVID DENKER

Rutgers University

SIDNEY B. FAY

Harvard University

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

Iowa State College

DONALD W. MITCHELL

Military Historian

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

JOHN P. ROCHE

Haverford College

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

Editorial Advisory Board:

CARROLL G. BOWEN

EDGAR B. COALE

HELEN F. FAUST

ELISE F. JONES

J. PARRY JONES

ESTHER H. LEEDS

JOEL T. LOEB

J. GORDON LOGUE

NANCY R. POSEL

RAMON L. POSEL

J. R. WIKE, JR.

65 cents a copy : 7 dollars a
year. Canada 7 dollars twenty-
five cents a year. Foreign in-
cluding the Philippines 7 dollars
fifty cents a year.

COMING SOON

CHANGING AMERICAN POLITICS

August, 1956

AMERICAN FARM POLICY

September, 1956

ISSUES OF THE 1956 ELECTIONS

October, 1956

In this presidential election year **CURRENT HISTORY** will devote three forthcoming issues to American political problems. Next month, six specialists will analyze some of the changing patterns of American political life. Since the end of the Second World War, our social and economic life has changed markedly in some respects and political patterns vary accordingly. What influence will these changes have on the election?

Most obvious changes of all are those in our major political parties. We have asked *Oscar Handlin*, Professor of History at Harvard University and author of *Adventure in Freedom* (among other books), to write on the changing nature of the Republican Party; *Norman Graebner*, Associate Professor of History at Iowa State College and author of a forthcoming work on American foreign policy, will analyze the changing nature of the Democratic party.

The role of lobbies in American political history will be described by *Roffe Wike*, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. *Edward Janosik*, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania, will consider the influence of a growing suburbia on the electoral habits of the nation. The part played by the independent voter will be discussed by *Murray Stedman*, Associate Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College.

Farmers and union members have new problems and these in turn have been woven into the pattern of American political life. The current role of labor will be described by *Jack Chernick*, Chairman of the Research Program, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University. *Gilbert Fite*, Chairman of the Department of History, University of Oklahoma will detail the political role of the American farmer.

IN SEPTEMBER, we shall devote the entire issue to a study of AMERICAN FARM POLICY.

IN OCTOBER, **CURRENT HISTORY** will deal with major issues for American voters this Fall.

Extra copies of these issues may be ordered now for fall classroom or debate use from the publication office.

Published monthly by Events Publishing Co., Inc. Publication Office, 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright 1956, by Events Publishing Company, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 31

JULY, 1956

No. 179

The United States has made political, economic and strategic commitments in the Far East. Some of the Asiatic nations are our allies, some are neutral and some side with the Communists. What can the United States expect of her Asiatic allies? What Far Eastern issues cause tension among them? In our first article, a noted British historian points out that "the American commitment to defend Formosa is politically the most serious of American involvements abroad at the present time . . . because it is a solitary American undertaking unsupported by powers which are America's allies in other fields of international security."

The Two Chinas

By G. F. Hudson

St. Antony's College, Oxford

IT OFTEN happens that serious conflicts in international relations lie unsolved, but dormant, in a condition of deadlock for long periods and then suddenly flare up into acute crises, just as a fire may seem to have burnt itself out in hot ash but bursts into flame again when something inflammable is thrown on to it. The situation in the Formosa Straits has at present this deceptive appearance of having somehow ceased to be dangerous, yet it can at any moment give rise once more to an emergency calling for vital decisions between peace and war by the government of the United States.

When a nation has assumed an obligation to render armed assistance to a foreign country against a threatened attack, the test of its will and capacity to fulfill its pledge may not occur for a long time. But then the crisis may come when it is least expected, and find the committed power politically, if not strategically, unprepared.

The American commitment to defend Formosa is politically the most serious of American involvements abroad at the present time—the most serious because, unlike the obligations arising from the NATO and

SEATO pacts and the United Nations intervention in Korea, it is a solitary American undertaking unsupported by powers which are America's allies in other fields of international security. For this reason, it is not only the issue on which America would be most isolated in the event of a major war, but it is also one that can be used diplomatically by the Communist powers to break up the solidarity of the Western democracies in their defence of the free world. It is, therefore, highly desirable that public opinion both in the United States and in Europe should have a clear comprehension of why this obligation has been undertaken, what is its justification, and how it bears on the related question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

In international law any two sovereign states have the right to make a treaty of defensive alliance with each other, and even though the Communists and their neutralist friends, of course, denounce defensive unions such as NATO and SEATO as aggressive and provocative, there can be no doubt that they are within the law. It is argued, however, that the American alliance

Bound by LIBRARY BINDING COMPANY, WACO, TEXAS DATE

with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa, even though it is strictly defensive in character, is an intervention in a civil war and therefore an illegal interference in China's internal affairs.

It is important to understand what are the implications of international law in this matter. The two basic principles with regard to a state involved in civil war are first, that no state is entitled to give material aid to rebels against a government with which it is in peaceful diplomatic relations, and second, that a state is entitled—though it is not required—to give aid to such a recognized government to help it suppress an internal revolt. By these criteria of international behaviour Russia was a violator of the law—not to mention her violation of specific undertakings in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August, 1945—in the aid which she gave to the Chinese Communists in Manchuria by transferring to them strategic positions and stocks of arms captured from the Japanese. These actions were aggressions against China, for the Communist forces were in revolt against the authority recognized at that time by Russia, as well as by the United States and Britain, as the legal government of China.

On the other hand, the American government was fully within its rights in giving such aid as it did give to the Chinese Nationalist Government in the period after the end of the Pacific war. This aid, at least in its military aspect, was on far too small a scale to meet the needs of Nationalist China after eight years of ruinous Japanese invasion. But it was—and much greater aid would have been—properly given to a friendly, allied and recognized government threatened by domestic disruption. This would be true even if the civil war had not been given, as it was given, an international character by Russia's aid to the rebels.

It is generally held, however, that if rebel forces in a country overthrow the authority of the previously established government and gain effective control of all, or the greater part of, the national territory, they can claim *de jure* recognition from other states on the ground of their actual possession of the country's sovereignty. In accordance with this principle, the Chinese Communist Govern-

ment in Peiping has been recognized as the legal government of China not only by the Communist states, but also by a number of neutral nations and within the Atlantic Alliance by Britain.

As a consequence of these transfers of recognition, it is now the United States which by its renewed support for the Chinese Nationalists since 1950 is widely regarded as upholding a rebel cause and interfering in a civil war which otherwise would have been settled long ago by a complete Communist victory. This despite the fact that American aid is limited to a purely defensive position in Formosa and adjacent islands. The American policy is viewed all the more critically because to many non-Communist observers the question of Formosa appears to be the principal obstacle to a peaceful settlement in the Far East. And the American opposition to the seating of a Peiping delegation to represent China in the United Nations seems to be an unnecessary perpetuation of international tension.

The American support for the Nationalists in Formosa is not, however, a case merely of a foreign power preserving by force in a portion of national territory a regime which has been defeated in a civil war and could not survive without external aid. If that were all, it might well be argued that the United States either should have intervened seriously while the Nationalist Government still held most of China or should have accepted the outcome of the revolution once the issue on the mainland had been decided.

But the Chinese civil war is not the whole story. The American government had in fact completely abandoned the Nationalist cause by the beginning of 1950; it was officially announced that no arms or advisers would be sent to Formosa, and the State Department sent a guidance circular to its diplomatic missions abroad telling them to be prepared for news of the fall of Formosa to the Communists in the near future.

What caused the reversal of this policy was the Communist attack on South Korea and the American decision to intervene against it. Although Communist China was not directly involved in the original North Korean attack, Peiping had just sent back

to Korea two Russian-trained Korean Communist divisions which had taken part in the civil war in China. And the official approval of the North Korean action left no doubt that the new aggression was part of a concerted policy of the Communist governments in the Far East. Four months later, after the defeat of the North Korean forces, Communist China intervened directly in Korea, deliberately making war on the United States and all the other members of the United Nations with expeditionary forces in Korea.

In these circumstances it would have been folly to stand by and allow the Chinese Communists to take over an insular territory of great strategic importance and capture or destroy an anti-Communist army of half a million men who were the natural allies of the powers being assailed by Communist China in Korea. Mao Tse-tung's China, having gone to war, and having been condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations, was legally liable to the invasion and occupation of any part of its territory by any or all of the nations it had attacked. And if in fact no offensive operations were conducted against its territory, this was due to the determination of the British and American governments to keep the war localized in Korea and not to any special right of immunity for China from the normal consequences of waging war.

The protection of Formosa—which originally involved also a prohibition of any Nationalist attack on the coast of the mainland—was only a minimum of what belligerent rights entitled the Americans to do; they could have seized Hainan or Shantung and be holding them today without reproach as far as international law is concerned. If the Communists and their friends everywhere have had much success with the plea that Peiping has a legal right to Formosa and that its future is purely an internal affair of China, this has been largely due to the mental confusion induced in Western countries by the fantastic pretense that one of the most bitter and bloody wars of modern times was not really a war at all.

The struggle in Korea was in reality just as much of a war as the earlier unpleasantness with Germany and Japan, and the Com-

munist powers which claim that the pre-war German territories east of the Oder and Neisse now irrevocably belong to Russia and Poland could not logically object if the United States were to declare Formosa American territory. This would be true even without taking account of the fact that Formosa had belonged to Japan for half a century and was only restored to China by the American victory in the Pacific war.

But there is no American policy of annexing Formosa or of imposing on it anything but a Chinese administration. The American aim is merely to keep an island of great strategic importance from falling into Communist hands and to preserve there the remnant of a friendly China which was overwhelmed on the mainland by a Soviet assisted and anti-Western revolution.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

The situation is thus that there are actually two Chinas, each with its own territory, government, civil administration and armed forces, and each claiming to be the sole legal government of the whole of China. The mainland is held by the Communists with the support of an alliance with, and arms from, the Soviet Union. Formosa is held by the Nationalists with the support of an alliance with, and arms from, the United States.

If an informal truce now prevails, it is because neither side can attack without incurring the gravest risks. The Nationalists dare not attempt a landing on the coast of the mainland without American assistance, and Washington has made it clear to them that they cannot expect protection if they embark on any such adventure; the Communists have been warned that if they invade Formosa they will have to fight America on the sea and in the air, and so far they have shrunk from such a challenge. Since the factors of power involved appear to be fairly stable, it may be held that there is no reason why this situation of *de facto* peace should not continue indefinitely without any formal treaty or agreement to give it legal recognition.

Unfortunately, the question of Formosa cannot be regarded simply as a local issue

and isolated from general world affairs; it necessarily intrudes into any consideration of the problem of Chinese representation in the United Nations. For, if there are currently in fact two Chinas in existence on the map of the world, there is in law only one China as a member of the United Nations, and either Peiping or Taipeh must be internationally recognized as having the right to appoint the Chinese delegation.

So far the Communist states and the states in favour of seating the Communist Chinese delegates have not been able to muster a majority for the transfer of recognition from Taipeh to Peiping. But it is well known that the present situation is accepted with a very ill grace by a number of states. They have so far refrained from open support of the transfer of recognition only out of the desire to avoid a head-on collision with American policy. Those nations, indeed, which have individually transferred diplomatic recognition to the Peiping government find themselves in a logically untenable position if they join in a refusal to seat the delegates of that government in the United Nations. And they feel it to be absurd that China should continue to be represented in the world forum by a government which now administers less than two per cent of its total population.

Moreover, the dispute gives fellow travelers and neutralists everywhere the opportunity to denounce America as the power which by an obstinate defiance of an accomplished fact is aggravating international tension and preventing the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Far East. The European nations which are allies of America not only in the Atlantic Pact but also in SEATO are very receptive of such propaganda. Having already during the Pacific war disengaged themselves from the affairs of China, they have long been disposed to write off resistance to communism there as a lost cause. They regard with apprehension the possibility of a major war breaking out on an issue which they consider to fall outside their vital interests.

Whatever the merits of the controversy, the international political trend in favour of admitting Communist China to the United Nations is too strong to be disregarded per-

manently by the American government. Even if the United States could in the last resort prevent the seating of Peiping delegates by use of the veto in the Security Council, it would be politically unwise to pursue to the bitter end, in the face of pressure from the Soviet bloc and Asian neutrals, a policy which so deeply divides the West.

This does not mean, however, that it is impossible to devise a new policy which would emerge from an attitude of mere negation towards the seating of Peiping delegates without any abandonment of American commitments towards Nationalist China. If a government which has waged war against forces operating on behalf of the United Nations, and has been formally condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations is to be given China's seat in the United Nations, that organization has surely a right to decide on terms for admission. If Communist China were to be allowed unconditionally to take over the Chinese representation in the United Nations, it would be a great blow to the Nationalists. It would also reduce them to the position of rebels against an internationally recognized government and would expose America legally to a charge of aggression for assisting them. This charge Moscow and Peiping would not hesitate to press to the utmost of their ability.

But this outcome could be avoided if the United Nations in admitting Communist China were explicitly to recognize that for the time being two Chinese states exist; that neither must be permitted to overcome the other by force; and that each should be represented separately until such time as the whole of the national territory can be reunified peacefully by a free expression of the nation's will. It would have to be made clear that there is no intention of making a permanent division of the Chinese nation, and that the separation would be merely a temporary arrangement necessitated by the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which makes impossible any democratic solution as between rival parties in the greater part of China.

Under such an arrangement the Peiping government, simply on the basis of the territory and population under its control, would be entitled to the Chinese seat in the

Security Council, but both Peiping and Taipeh (Republic of China in Taiwan as it might be called) would be represented in the Assembly. Opposition to this solution would have to be expected from both sides, but the United Nations would be in a strong position for meeting it. If the Chinese Communists protested that their inalienable legal rights were being violated by a partition of China's territory, it would be necessary to remind them that they were convicted aggressors whose admission to the organized world society could only be by favour and not by right; if in the end they refused to come in on the terms laid down, then at least the main burden of responsibility for their exclusion would rest on them and no longer on the Western powers.

The Chinese Nationalists would no doubt be equally reluctant to accept a formula which would formally deny their claim to be the sole legal government of China. But it could be pointed out to them that the solution was essentially a temporary one and that for the period of separation it would give them an assured international status as a sovereign government.

An alternative solution favoured in some quarters is to declare Formosa an independent state on the ground not of its position as the last stronghold of Chinese national resistance to Communism, but of an alleged desire of the people of Formosa for separate existence as a Formosan nation. This idea has the superficial attraction of avoiding any general ideological contest and bringing the question of Formosa under the head of national separatist movements; it would also provide a pretext for getting rid of the Nationalist government as such and dealing only with native Formosan politicians.

But the project has really no valid ethnic basis. It is quite true that Formosa under Japanese rule missed the educational development of modern China which has spread a Chinese national consciousness of the modern type through the teaching of the standard Chinese language in the schools. Formosans of the older generation speak only Fukien dialects, which are unintelligible to most Chinese, with Japanese as their second language. But the younger generation since

1945 has been learning standard Chinese and undoubtedly feels much more Chinese than its elders. This generation will become more and more important politically in the island as time goes on.

There is no future for Formosan independence as a national separatist cause. The independence of Formosa can only be justified as a means of preserving an alternative set of values and way of life in one province of China for as long as the rest of the country remains under a system of totalitarian tyranny which tolerates neither political nor cultural opposition.

There is, however, a widespread embarrassment in Western countries at the prospect of assuming liability for the protection of a regime which in the days of its rule on the mainland was itself a party dictatorship and can hardly even now claim support as an established democracy. On this issue it is necessary to recognize frankly the character of Kuomintang rule in the past and the difficulty of introducing full political liberty in a territory under continual threat of military invasion. But there is today in political practice far more freedom in Formosa than on the other side of the straits and in political principles the difference is fundamental.

The Kuomintang, following the doctrine evolved by Sun Yat-sen, proclaimed the need for "tutelage" by a single party as a preliminary to the establishment of free democracy in China. Though party leaders showed themselves in no great hurry to terminate their period of political monopoly, they have never repudiated political liberty as a goal. The Communists, on the other hand, regard the exclusive rule of their party as the political ultimate; there can be nothing beyond it except the "withering away of the state."

It is because of this basic ideological difference that Formosa can hold out a promise of future freedom for China, while Chairman Mao cannot. There is a widespread view that the victory of communism in China is final and irrevocable and that it is folly to support any anti-Communist resistance; the only hope on these premises is that of an "independent" development of Chinese communism which might be checked by an opposition tending to make Peiping more reliant on Russia than it would otherwise wish to be.

But Chinese communism shows every sign of entering its "iron age" of forced collectivization of the peasantry with all the extreme tensions that this process involves. And it does so at a time when the ideological revisions going on in Russia and the Communist countries of Europe are, to say the

least of it, unhelpful to the Maoist élite of China. The Chinese Communist regime has still to face the crucial tests of its domestic policy and, as long as it is still opposed on Chinese soil, even across a hundred miles of intervening sea, it must carry out its coercion of the Chinese people with radio voices of counter-propaganda and disclosure at every stage—something that Stalin never had to contend with.

It is essential to refrain from indulging in any complacent optimism, but the whole Communist world has suffered spiritual damage from the debunking of Stalin. The regime in China is certainly not free from internal conflicts. At any rate, nothing has yet occurred which should make the Western nations less resolved to "contain" communism within the borders which it has already reached.

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, from 1926 to 1954, G. F. HUDSON was also a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow (1932) and has been associated with the British Foreign Office (1939-1946). In 1954, he became Director of Far Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford. He is the author of Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800 and The Far East in World Politics.

United States Foreign Aid

Summary of Net U.S. Grants and Credits in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945-1955)

	Net Grants	Net Credits	Net Total
Greece	\$1,208,000,000	\$81,100,000	\$1,289,000,000
Turkey	226,000,000	94,000,000	320,000,000
Iran	147,000,000	54,000,000	201,000,000
Egypt	26,000,000	4,000,000	30,000,000
Israel	233,000,000	137,000,000	370,000,000
Jordan	25,000,000	25,000,000
Liberia	6,000,000	19,000,000	25,000,000
Unspecified (Near East and Africa)	189,000,000	-7,000,000	182,000,000
Afghanistan	3,000,000	26,000,000	29,000,000
India	116,000,000	228,000,000	344,000,000
Pakistan	142,000,000	15,000,000	157,000,000
Unspecified (South Asia)	19,000,000	19,000,000
Totals by Area			
Near East and Africa	\$1,967,000,000	\$532,000,000	\$2,499,000,000
South Asia	280,000,000	268,000,000	548,000,000
Near East, South Asia and Africa	\$2,247,000,000	\$800,000,000	\$3,047,000,000

—Department of State Bulletin

In Southeast Asia the United States has tried to build an alliance to strengthen this area against Communist penetration. "... It is hoped that SEATO will gradually entitle itself to the admiration and respect of the free nations of Southeast Asia who must, in the last analysis, achieve their rightful destiny by their own resources and leadership."

Collective Defense In Southeast Asia

By Arthur H. Dean

Special Ambassador to Korea, 1953-54

FOR 180 years, the United States has stood for the ideals of national independence and self-government. Our belief in these ideals for ourselves and for others is so fundamental that we are prepared to spend, and when necessary have spent, our lives for them. Since World War II, the bright hope of national independence and self-determination has been growing in Southeast Asia. Two key objectives of our country's policies in Southeast Asia are to protect this hope from the dark cloud of Communist imperialism and to encourage economic and political development which will make that deeply felt desire realizable.

One of the means by which the United States hopes to support and foster the principles of independent self-government in the East is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, a modest, but immensely important attempt to adapt the principle of collective defense to the geography and politics of Asia. Collective defense, a familiar arrangement to occidental countries and one sanctioned by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, had little significance to Southeast Asia while most of its territories were colonies of Western powers.

This is no longer so. Fifteen Asian and

African nations have gained political independence since World War II. They have been born into a perilous world in which the infant mortality rate of nations is directly affected by the speed at which they attain political maturity. Collective association for defensive strength is one measure of such maturity.

In September of 1954 Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, agreeing that they

separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

In case of armed attack against one of the parties or against territory in the treaty area unanimously designated for protection, each will "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." In case of any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the treaty area (which is presently limited to the general area of the Southwest Pacific and does not extend so far north as Taiwan), they will immediately consult regarding measures to be taken for the common defense.

Concurrently with signing the defense treaty, the treaty powers proclaimed in the Pacific Charter their belief in the right of all peoples to independence, freedom and self-determination should they desire it and

ARTHUR H. DEAN, *Special Ambassador to Korea 1953-54, received his LL.B degree from Cornell University. He is a partner in the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, New York.*

be able to undertake its responsibilities. They affirmed the signatories' intention to promote economic progress and social well-being as a part of the collective effort.

Here, then, was the initiation of a great experiment for Asia and the free world. Can SEATO prove itself a factor in effective military deterrence of communism? If so, will it be a success? If in bringing about military deterrence it also can bolster the economic strength of the Asiatic members of the alliance and encourage their development as equal, independent co-partners with their more powerful occidental allies, it should help prove that neutralism is not the only alternative to colonialism. Achievement of each of these objectives depends in large measure upon achievement of the other, and each must, as President Eisenhower has said, be accomplished with understanding and respect for "the right of each nation to choose its own path."

EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

Three kinds of attack threaten Southeast Asia: external aggression, internal subversion and economic or political blandishment.

For defense against overt aggression, SEATO's strength ultimately depends upon its capacity to utilize the powerful mobile land, sea and air forces which the United States has stationed on the American Continent and has concentrated at strategic jump-off points along the Pacific arc—the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines. This accords with America's strategy of obtaining maximum defensive capability from its armed resources. The mobile striking force is designed to be put quickly into action in any of the three probable areas of battle should there be aggression in the Far East.

United States forces should be able to move to Korea, to Taiwan or to Southeast Asia by air and by sea speedily and with strength. We ought not to scatter our power into showpieces of ineffective size by establishing substantial stationary United States forces in forward areas, since our military establishment is relatively small compared with the extent of the territory to be protected.

In spite of the importance of the United

States' mobile force, each partner can make significant contributions to SEATO's common defense against armed attack according to its ability, its situation and its capacity. All of the allies can be expected to provide ground forces and the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to accepting a major part of the financial burden, will contribute equipment and naval, air and ground forces, depending upon the nature of the operation. The air defense in Southeast Asia will undoubtedly be based chiefly in Malaya (an arrangement which Malaya will presumably wish to continue after she attains independence) and Singapore, Bangkok and Clark Field in Luzon. The major naval force will be the United States Seventh Fleet, supported by Far Eastern units of the British and French navies, complicated perhaps by the withdrawal of the French military high command from Saigon, the uncertain status of the British naval and air bases at Trincomalee and Katunayake, Ceylon and the arrangement which the British work out with Singapore about the naval base there.

SEATO's military planners are preparing studies on the defense of the treaty area against military aggression. Already there is a common pool of intelligence information contributed to, and mutually available to, all member countries. This collaboration by the military planners and by the intelligence units in peacetime should establish in advance the mutual confidence and capacity for joint operation required in case of war.

OPERATION FIRM LINK

In February of 1956 SEATO undertook Operation Firm Link, the first combined military maneuvers of the young alliance. All member countries except Pakistan and France, who sent observers, participated in this amphibious operation, which included landings by marines from helicopters sent from aircraft carriers and paratroopers bailing into the skies of Thailand from United States Globemasters and Flying Boxcars protected by F-84 Jet Fighters, supplemented by naval operations in adjacent seas.

Operation Firm Link did its job. It indi-

cated some of the strengths and exposed for correction some of the weaknesses of SEATO. It demonstrated that a combined force of the SEATO countries could, in fact, be put into the field on short notice and that such a quickly assembled force could cooperatively carry out a military maneuver. The proposed use of mobile United States forces was graphically illustrated when the white mushrooms of the parachutes of the 508th Paratroop Regiment, whose home station is over 2,000 miles to the north in Japan, tumbled into the skies of Thailand and floated gracefully down to her rice fields carrying tough riflemen ready for battle.

The Operation was effected on such short notice that Pakistan declined to participate but sent observers. This pointed up two weaknesses. First, not sufficient liaison between the powers. Second, hours, not weeks, should suffice to have the alliance mobilizing and delivering allotted contributions to combined operations. Aggressors frequently lack the politeness to grant two weeks' notice of intended attacks.

The major deficiency of Operation Firm Link, however, was its small scope. Commonwealth countries contributed some 100 marines, four destroyers and a squadron of jet fighters. United States personnel consisted of some 6,000 or 7,000 persons. Since Communist China is estimated to have 2.5 million men and 2,000 combat aircraft at its command, such a tiny operation by SEATO is not commensurable with its potential burden, even though the significance of overall figures of Red Chinese strength may be mitigated by factors such as inadequacy of transportation and lack of sufficient well-trained pilots.

Still, in its modest and purposeful way, SEATO is learning to organize the combined resources of its members so that eventual prospects for a satisfactory Southeast Asia defensive military establishment are growing.

INTERNAL SUBVERSION

Of the multiplicity of techniques used by communism for aggrandizement the staged *coup d'état* by indigenous Communists is perhaps the most difficult with which to cope. For Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Singapore, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and In-

donesia the possibility of being principal in an Asian parallel to the bitter Czechoslovakia episode, or the stark example of North Vietnam, may be uncomfortably real. Yet communism, with its current accent on peace, is making severe inroads. Illustrative of this are the recent elections in Ceylon, where pro-West Premier Sir John Kotelawala was thoroughly defeated, in Indonesia, where the Communists polled 6.1 million votes, and in Burma, where the Communist-led National United Front did better than expected.

This was due largely it is believed to the Soviet successes in buying surplus rice in exchange for machinery and technicians, to our inability to buy Burmese rice because of our own surplus production and to our own preempting of normal Burmese rice markets by rice sales to Japan, India and Indonesia for local currencies with which we aid the local economies. A particularly troublesome feature of the Soviet economic offensive is that Communist technicians are being sent to Southeast Asian countries as part of such barter arrangements.

A major objective of SEATO is to counter foreign-directed subversion against the political independence of nations in the treaty area. Where this threatens, SEATO permits immediate consultation "in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense." As one result of the apparent switch in the Communist offensive from direct military action to more subtle courtship, internal security rather than direct aggression becomes a more urgent challenge.

Internal security's preliminary problem is detection. Subversion may manifest itself in keen subtleties of palace politics, agricultural economics or offers of Communist economic aid; in the hortatory rough and tumble of electoral politics; in slogging military and police actions against subtly financed and organized jungle-hidden guerilla armies operating at night. Bound by the United Nations Charter, the Pacific Charter and the SEATO treaty itself to uphold the principle of self-determination, SEATO must be alert to anticipate and thwart any externally directed effort to seize or subvert any of the treaty area countries.

At the same time it must avoid unwarranted interference with their internal affairs. The fierce crosscurrents of sects, minorities, religion, nationalism and local rivalries, the need for agricultural reform, the varying racial communities and the myriad complexities of Asian communal ways frequently make the distinction between the internal and the externally directed insurrection very difficult indeed.

The opportunity to learn from each other is considerable: for example, from the Philippine Republic's notable success under the leadership of Ramon Magsaysay, now its President, in uprooting the Hukbalahaps, a Communist-encouraged band of insurgents who threatened to whisk away the Republic's newly granted independence. Again, the British while fighting Malaya's Communists in a guerilla war are simultaneously helping Malaya assume independence. In Singapore, a city 85 per cent Chinese, many of whom seem to be oriented to Red China, the British are negotiating to give the Crown Colony substantial independence without foregoing control over the huge naval base. This cauterizing operation will need some provisions for reassumption of British responsibility if security cannot be maintained by the local government.

[Training internal police and exchanging intelligence information and mutual experience may help each country discover and prevent covert overthrow of its genuine government and obviate the need for outside assistance in preserving internal safety. At the very least, these are useful preliminary actions.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The final success or failure of SEATO may well depend upon its political success or failure. Since all Southeast Asian countries except Thailand have been economically developed by foreigners in the colonial pattern, in 1956 the primary test is that of "colonialism." Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India expresses Asia's neutralist fears:

Asia is still mined with anti-Western suspicion. This is a fact of history and only a different evolution of future history will modify it.

It is noteworthy that Burma, Ceylon, India

and Indonesia have not chosen to become members of SEATO, and the 1955 conference at Bandung indicates a new consciousness of solidarity and anti-Western suspicion on the part of Asian and African countries.

Some explanation of the real or professed belief that SEATO may be a new method for Western domination is found in Nehru's view that:

A chief technique whereby Western powers obtained control in Eastern lands was by siding with one or the other side in a local civil war and then dominating the victor to whom they had assured success.

Since only three of SEATO's eight members are regarded as typical Asian nations, Nehru's analysis challenges SEATO's sincerity and its ability to achieve peaceful aspirations through a military alliance. The success of the alliance as a partnership and the Asian people's wholehearted belief in it are crucial.

Because SEATO must avoid either the fact or appearance of occidental domination its organization is inevitably much looser than that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It has neither a supranational joint command nor a common army, at least at this time. Like any recent arrival in a new community, SEATO must earn respect and acceptance from its neighbors by quiet demonstration of its sincerity.

The pledge by treaty members to promote self-government and independence for those who desire it and are able to assume its responsibilities is being redeemed by British negotiations for constitutional development in Malaya and in Singapore. Final independence and self-government for Malaya are scheduled for about August, 1957. It is encouraging to note that Chief Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman has already indicated that Malaya, upon achieving independence, will consider applying for SEATO membership.

Singapore's problem is more complex. Chief Minister David Marshall argues that full independence is necessary to avoid increasing nationalist frustration and to stabilize resistance to "totalitarian colonialism," but the British are not sure that the democratic forces will be strong enough to cope with the strong threat of subversion.

The West may believe that the suppression of its former desire for colonial domination is evidenced by its voluntary withdrawals since World War II. Nevertheless capitalism has cut deep, and Soviet propaganda has liberally sprinkled the sores with lye. Asia has yet to be fully convinced that we are true partners whose accent is on peace and encouragement of national aspirations of the Asian peoples. Since World War II most Southeast Asian countries have experienced the first satisfying realization of their deep desire for both political and economic independence. Mere logic will not of itself dissuade them from seeking to reaffirm and test that independence or from their long-established suspicion of the West and of capitalism.

Cambodia is an example. Ex-Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who remains the significant political power in Cambodia, returned in February from an excursion to Peking and soon announced Cambodia's rejection of the protection of SEATO in favor of a policy of neutralism. Cambodia is a land of 4.5 million people and its economy is boosted by United States aid, without any commitment to enter SEATO, at the rate of \$50 million a year, one of the two or three highest per capita aid programs in the world.

Thailand has announced a program of economic cooperation with Cambodia and Communist China has reportedly signed a trade agreement with her for the exchange of \$22 million worth of goods. In such a situation, our aid must be given with no strings attached. The important thing is that Cambodia remain a free, healthy and independent member of the Southeast Asia community, not that she agree to align herself with us in exchange for aid. This accords with Secretary Dulles' view that

The United States does not seek ties of mutual defense with any country whatsoever unless that country believes that this application of the principle of collective security will better assure its independence.

A second political consideration is neutralism. The brutal education as to their true character which the Soviets have given the world has not always been absorbed in the

agricultural and largely communal East, which tends to accept sweet Soviet promises at face value. In India, for example, direct Communist military assault is considered so unlikely that preparations for defense are not needed. Communism is disliked—and fought—only as a domestic political disease. Neutrality has made India prominent politically, because of her non-alignment with either of the two major groupings of nations; but great damage to democracy accrues from such toleration of Communist dictatorial methods.

Burma, which borders on Communist China for almost a thousand miles and also shares a long border with SEATO's Thailand, ought strategically to be part of the collective defense organization. Instead, Burma, primarily Buddhist, anti-materialist and on the whole hostile to the Chinese Nationalist, hews to the hope that neutrality will suffice to pacify Communist desires to control her territory.

Ultimately, SEATO must hope that the neutralists—at least those along the geographical margin south of Red China—will perceive the true nature of the Communist threat and, further, will be convinced that by collective resources and coordinate action SEATO offers both the prospect of a successful defense of their territories and of independent development in accord with their own ideas.

Although the United States has declared its understanding that "armed attack" when used in the treaty refers to Communist aggression, SEATO's scope is broader. At the meeting of the foreign ministers of the eight treaty powers in Karachi in March of 1956, SEATO expressed support of Pakistan against claims of Soviet-backed Afghanistan with respect to the habitat of the Pushtu-speaking tribes of the Afghan-Pakistan border. It also bolstered Pakistan's position on the Kashmir question and further antagonized India by affirming the need for an early settlement "through the United Nations or by direct negotiations."

The declaration on Kashmir prompted a bitter complaint by Nehru that SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (the alliance in the Middle East between Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, and, on a non-member basis, the

United States) are operating against India, and supplying Pakistan with arms which may be used to attack her. In spite of what we sincerely believe to be the inaccuracy of this view, it must be given careful attention.

This sampling of the political problems confronting SEATO shows that there are no easy answers to the conflicting national interests, rivalries and suspicions affecting it. But with our faith in the good purpose of SEATO and with patient and tactful pursuit of that purpose with the free nations of Southeast Asia, we may hope to dissuade ungrounded fears and to avoid entanglement in most of the unrelated jealousies or frictions between such nations.]

SEATO is not the cause of the many frictions for which it may be blamed. Indeed, foregoing SEATO would be no solution to them. In its present form it contributes to the comfort of its three Asian members and to the defense and political health of Southeast Asia by helping to justify, particularly in the case of Thailand, a policy of full alignment with the West.

ECONOMIC ASPECT

Although, under various programs of mutual assistance, economic aid from the member states to countries covered by SEATO exceeded \$700 million in the first two years of the treaty, the alliance is not of itself being used as an organization for economic aid. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has rightly pointed out that the Asiatic members of SEATO, although deserving special consideration, do not form an economic pattern, and outside economic aid cannot ignore non-member nations in the area. Nor do we want to insist upon alliance with the United States as a prerequisite to aid. The important goal is to have genuinely free and independent Asiatic nations. Assistance to needy countries must be given with or without alliance. Survival, not servitude, is what we most want for them.

In keeping with this theory, some \$800-900 million of economic assistance has been devoted to Southeast Asian countries, including non-members, since June, 1954. Where possible, such aid is funneled through the Colombo Plan, a system of bilateral economic assistance operating through an inter-

governmental committee of the 17 participating countries, in preference to SEATO. The World Bank, the United Nations and other agencies are also used. These do not imply commitments characteristic of an alliance, and they can include almost all the free countries of Asia.

The economic and cultural opportunities of SEATO are not, however, ignored. At the March, 1956, meeting, the Council reiterated the objective of Article III of the treaty:

the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

A public relations officer was appointed and posts of economic officer and cultural relations officer were created.

Defense expenditures in the treaty countries have, of course, stimulated their economies, and over \$500 million in economic aid has flowed from the United States to the treaty area under bilateral treaties. United States economic aid is emphasizing irrigation, drainage, fertilization and improved agricultural methods; development of mineral resources; public health; railroads, roads and other transport facilities to open cheaper and easier trade outlets; and an improved village life which will provide a more wholesome outlet for the enthusiasm and restlessness of Asian youth.

The United States' administration is well aware that its allies need economic as well as military strength. Economic consultation and cooperation are as yet only a small part of SEATO's activities and probably should be expanded to emphasize again the cooperative and non-aggressive design of the alliance, but the facilities for disbursing such aid are many and it need not go through SEATO to have the desired effect.

IMMEDIATE SECURITY PROBLEMS

As SEATO struggles to strengthen the weaknesses in its embryonic structure, it faces several immediately pressing threats: the presence of Pathet Laos troops in Northern Laos; the political renunciation of the protection of the treaty by Cambodia, the apparent change of heart of ex-Premier

Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the friction between Cambodia and Thailand as well as between Cambodia and South Vietnam; the precarious situation in South Vietnam; potential threats to Thailand's independence; the uncertainty arising from the forthcoming constitutional developments in Singapore and Malaya; and the apparent turn to the Left in Ceylon.

When the Collective Defense Treaty was signed, it was agreed that aggression against any territory unanimously designated as within the treaty's protection would activate its provisions. Concurrently with the signing of the treaty the parties signed a protocol designating Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as within this clause.

This poses an immediate issue in Laos, where the Geneva Agreement signed in July, 1954, permitted the Communist Pathet Lao forces to enter the Northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua to regroup pending a political settlement. The Royal government has sought without success to reach a settlement wherein the Pathet Lao forces would be disbanded. Premier Souvanna of Laos is now faced with the proposition of whether or not to drive the rebels out with force.

In South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem has shown great resilience in defeating the independent armies of the various factions in the complicated religious and political composition of the country, in deposing Bao Dai and in winning support of the people in elections. But the flood of refugees from the North, the large number of Communist insurgents, and the factional hatreds and rivalries of his country preclude any assurance of stability.

Another major security question is what protective measures should be taken for the safety of Thailand. Twenty thousand "Free Thais" led by Pridi Phanomyong are reported to be poised in Yunnan, China, ready to drive southward at any time. This force may find ready volunteers among the 50 thousand refugees from Vietnam relocated in northern Thailand, 90 per cent of whom are, according to former United States Envoy John Puerifoy, pro-Communist. In the south, Malayan Communist guerilla armies are prone to retreat up the Isthmus of Kra

into Thai territory when hard pressed by British and Malayan troops.

The fragility of the independence which Great Britain is striving to arrange for Malaya and for Singapore dramatizes the fundamental problem. Will the effect of British withdrawal be to eliminate all protection from seizure and subjugation by Communist tyranny?

It is early to attempt to assess SEATO. The progress so far has been modest, yet encouraging. Operation Firm Link indicates both the remarkably rapid initial organization of a joint defense against armed attack and also the considerable inadequacy of such defense for an ultimate test. Subversion, which has supplanted direct military attack as the chief concern of SEATO, is inevitably one of the most difficult of problems.

So far, there is no satisfactory solution. Continuous consultations by the member countries, training of effective internal police forces and the commitment to agree on measures for common defense against subversion, without intrusion on sovereignty or natural self-respect, represent some advance and may lead to more concrete measures by the Asian countries.

Neither politically nor economically has SEATO realized its full potentiality. By eschewing histrionics, and pursuing regional rather than selfishly provincial policies, it is hoped that SEATO will gradually entitle itself to the admiration and respect of the free nations of Southeast Asia who must, in the last analysis, achieve their rightful destiny by their own resources and leadership.

SEATO is a natural continuance of NATO and the Baghdad Pact as a part of the free world's perimeter system of collective security. The prospect of the creative transformation of NATO from an exclusively military accent to one with greater concern for economic and political considerations may presage a similar change of accent for SEATO. However, since any unified economic program for Southeast Asia must include certain non-members of SEATO, such as India, Ceylon, Burma, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Indonesia, aid would no doubt move principally through the Colombo Plan and other channels less restricted than SEATO. Once the mini-

imum amount of defensive military strength has been established, it becomes immensely desirable for the alliance to pursue these broader and more constructive mutual objectives which express much more accurately our fundamental aspirations for the peoples of Asia—*independence, self-determination*

and freedom from economic want.

If SEATO continues its solid, steady, sensible progress, is there not good reason to hope that collective security will be a useful adjunct to an Asia of free, secure and independent peoples striving to achieve economic betterment, sound justice and political unity?



The Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization today concluded its second meeting held in Karachi from March 6 to March 8, under the chairmanship of Hamidul Huq Choudhury, Foreign Minister of Pakistan. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Council members reaffirmed their Government's support for the United Nations and their continued intention to conduct their policies in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

* * * * *

The Council agreed that the treaty and the progress of the treaty organization have made a noteworthy contribution to the maintenance of peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific and have helped to deter armed aggression in the treaty area.

* * * * *

The Council members severally affirmed that their countries will never commit aggression and that their cooperation under this treaty is directed toward mutual defense and the maintenance of peace.

* * * * *

The Council reviewed steps taken by member Governments under Article 2 to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without."

They found that the defense forces of the member nations in Asia have been appreciably improved since the signing of the treaty and are better equipped and deployed to act in an emergency. Member Governments have assisted one another on an increasing scale in the training and equipping of these forces.

Through its military advisers SEATO has made a good beginning in planning for the co-ordinated use of the forces in collective self-defense. During the year a number of joint military exercises by some of the SEATO powers were held, including the "firm link" combined land, sea and air exercises held in and around Bangkok on Feb. 15-18. These exercises pointed the way to further cooperative efforts for the common defense.

The Council welcomed the progress recorded in the past year in reducing dangers posed to the territorial integrity and political stability of the area by subversive activities directed from without. In considering the continuing threat, the Council noted that the members concerned have significantly improved the quality of their security forces and have moved ahead with other measures to reduce threats to democratic government and social progress.

* * * * *

... From a communiqué issued by the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Can we count on Japan as an ally? Writes this author: "Let us not weigh Japan's need of us against our need of Japan. We need each other."

Japan: Ally For Peace

By Harold S. Quigley

Professor Emeritus of History, University of Minnesota

DEFEATED and demoralized Japan has made remarkable progress during the past decade and is now raising its head, not in defiance nor in humiliation, but with self-respect and good will. Ninety million people crowd its four main islands, comprising an area smaller than California. The arable acreage cannot feed them. Housing is pitifully inadequate. Despite industrial recovery on an amazing scale there is a high degree of unemployment.

Uncertainty as to Japan's place in the world and its most desirable goals has not been wholly dissipated. But there are hope and determination that the genius of a great people will assert itself to raise Japan to its proper place among the nations:

For an economy accustomed to governmental guidance the shift of power from an oligarchy composed of seasoned civilian and military leaders to a bureaucracy which must work through parliament entails confusion and delay in the development of policies and programs. This is a healthy situation from the point of view of political liberals but it tends to slow the pace of reconstruction.

Many of the political and economic and legal changes imposed by the Occupation are now in process of revision or repeal. In consequence there are doubts in many minds

as to what may or may not be done legally. The Japanese want to reorganize their political and economic system in accordance with their own traditions and beliefs. Yet they are fully aware that wholesale rejection of Occupational reforms would be disadvantageous. This operates as a brake on the machinery of revision. They are feeling their way carefully, weighing their "New Deal" in the balance, throwing out what is found wanting, and holding fast to that which is, in their judgment, good.

In the field of foreign relations the government of Japan today has five main objectives: to assist in maintaining world peace; to continue close and cordial relations with the United States; to become a member of the United Nations; to establish regular diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.; and to balance its exports against its imports. A sixth objective is perhaps equally important: to regain the confidence of the peoples of Asia.

Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu have spoken frequently of Japan's consuming desire that the present tension between the United States and Russia shall not bring on war. Mr. Shigemitsu's address before the National Press Club in Washington on August 30, 1955, epitomizes the general sentiment of the Japanese:

Peace is our common quest, our common goal. For, as your President has so truthfully said, "there is no alternative to peace." Surely the Japanese people are second to none in their earnest solicitude for peace, for they are the only people who have actually tasted the infernal power of the atomic bombs. They know full well what woeful calamity would visit mankind should war ever be waged again. A nuclear war

HAROLD S. QUIGLEY is co-author of The New Japan: Government and Politics. In 1946-47 he was research consultant in the Civil Intelligence section of SCAP in Tokyo. Author of several books and articles on the Far East, Mr. Quigley has also taught this field for 35 years.

would certainly spell cosmic suicide. Today mankind stands on the very threshold of hell. . . . If you could read our newspapers you would discover . . . how very enthusiastically they have reported the Geneva conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. That, I submit, is the measure of the overwhelming desire of our people for peace.

Another statement by the Foreign Minister during his visit here made it clear that his government was not for peace at any price:

I hear, however, that there are some people in the United States who fear that Japan may fraternize with the Communist powers seeking a neutralist course. I believe such an unlikely course would be fatal for us. Since the cold war is a global struggle between light and darkness, how can Japan, devoted as she is to freedom and justice, possibly be an indifferent onlooker? In the arc of liberty which constitutes the free nations' frontier in East Asia Japan occupies the central position.

This is obviously not an unqualified assurance of Japanese support in the event of an attack upon the United States. But such an assurance would be beyond the authority of the Japanese cabinet to give since the new constitution declares that "the Japanese people forever renounce war," also that "land, sea and air forces will never be maintained." The latter clause already is a dead letter but as yet the constitution has not been amended.

Beyond question it will be amended if the conservatives retain power and are able to muster the two-thirds majority in each house of the Diet and the majority of the popular vote now required by the constitution. It is doubtful, however, that it is the issue of constitutionalism which agitates the people of Japan. They are for peace because Japan is militarily and economically weak and is so situated geographically that war would be suicidal.

Why, then, have they spent many billions of yen on a new military machine which employed nearly 196 thousand men at the end of 1955? Set up in 1950 as a gendarmerie at the behest of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers—General Douglas MacArthur—the original force was limited to 75 thousand men. In 1952 a naval squadron

was added and in 1954 an air force. All three are administered under a "Defence Agency" headed by a civilian minister who is a member of the cabinet. For the current fiscal year (1955-56), the total budget is approximately 86 billion yen (\$241 million).

Official statements have been careful to refrain from calling these forces by their true names, in part because of the constitutional prohibition, more importantly because of the widespread objection to rearmament. The strong Socialist Party has consistently and vehemently led this opposition but the conservatives themselves have been lukewarm against it. Not only are the party politicians fearful of being involved in war. They also are anxious to build up the parliamentary system and they have no desire to contend again with a powerful military hierarchy. Their attitude is that the country's dignity and independence call for rearmament but that this should be on a scale which would arouse no fear of aggression among their neighbors.

THE "SECURITY TREATY"

The United States and Japan are linked by a "Security Treaty"¹ signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951. This treaty recognizes that a disarmed Japan cannot defend itself if attacked and affirms that "Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan." The treaty not only grants to the United States the right to aid in protecting Japan against attack from without but to assist the Japanese government "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers."

Although Japan is not bound by this treaty to aid in the protection of the United States it agreed in the Treaty of San Francisco, by which the state of war in the Pacific was legally terminated, "to give the United Nations every assistance in any action taken in accordance with the Charter

¹ For complete text, see *Current History*, October, 1951, p. 230.

and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action."

In accordance with the treaty of security the United States has stationed ground, air and naval forces of considerable strength in and about Japan. It has built and enlarged naval and air bases. By administrative agreement it has applied military law in cases involving American civilian and military personnel employed in Japan under the treaty. Thus, although the postwar Occupation came to an end in April, 1952, its military aspect continued.

Quite naturally, this has not been relished by the people though it has redounded to their economic advantage due to the huge purchases which we have made for the equipment, housing and maintenance of our forces. Farmers resent having to surrender land for air fields. In some instances the location of artillery ranges has aroused complaint.

However the principal objection is due to the general anxiety to be completely independent. That this attitude worries the government may be implied from the statements of Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to the Japan Society in New York on September 1, 1955. He said:

We have now come to a stage where I fear the defense arrangement under the Security Treaty is becoming outmoded. As a truly independent nation we would like to place the present unilateral defense relationship between our countries on a new basis founded upon the principle of mutuality—a basis that will enable us to share increasing responsibilities and become better partners in the area of our common security. Such a basis will, I am sure, ensure greater popular support of the nation's defense efforts.

Mr. Shigemitsu also remarked that he did not believe that mere increase in the number of soldiers would greatly enhance security; that it was far more important to have the active support of the nation at large for the defense efforts. He pointed out, however, that in Japan there is a greater sensitivity to defense costs because "the economic margin of life" is narrower than in the United States.

Well we know [he said] that the soldier's pack is lighter than the slave's chains but if the defense burden is such as to necessitate the lowering of the already too low standard of life of the broad masses of the people it will inevitably cause social unrest and thereby invite subversion. And so as we progressively built up our national defense we must take into account the need to balance our defense capabilities with our economic capabilities.

The dilemma posed, on the one hand, by the Japanese government's desire to cooperate with the United States and, on the other, by the people's insistence upon an independence which they are ill-equipped to sustain alone, is well understood and sympathized with by our government. We have given informal assurances of cooperation in efforts to bring about conditions enabling Japan to assume primary responsibility for its own defense and to contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the Western Pacific. We have further agreed that under such conditions it would be appropriate to replace the Security Treaty with one of greater mutuality.

Moreover, Japan's contribution to the support of American forces in Japan has been reduced and schedules are under consideration for the progressive withdrawal of our ground forces. While these understandings fell short of meeting the desiderata expressed by the Japanese government Mr. Shigemitsu's subsequent report to the Diet indicated that cooperation with the United States in diplomacy and defense continued to be regarded as the basis of national policy.

With 300 of the 467 seats in the House of Representatives (to 154 Socialists, 2 Communists and 4 Leftist Farmer-Laborites) the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Mr. Hatoyama, is in a strong position and there is no present indication of any serious threat to its tenure. The last general election was held in February, 1955, and the normal term of a House is four years. Both the Liberal Democrats and the Socialists are recently organized coalitions. Both have to contend with factionalism. Of the two parties the former appears to be the more likely to hold together, since the doctrinal cleavage between Right and the Left wing Socialists is wide.

It may be hazarded, therefore, that the present government will finish its term unless economic conditions should worsen. If one may attach weight to the utterances of Mr. Suzuki, a Left wing Socialist who now heads the party, a shift of control to the Socialists would weaken, if not destroy, our cooperative defense relations with Japan. Mr. Suzuki has trumpeted that the Socialists "would set Japan free from military control by the United States of America." This, of course, was campaign propaganda. The Socialists would not, if they could, invite Russian or Chinese occupation. Moreover, they know that the United States has no imperialist designs upon Japan. But they do not wish to be drawn into a war which is not of their own choosing. They would prefer, rather, to stand neutral and to exert their efforts for peace from that position.

Since 1949 the number of Communists in the House of Representatives has dropped from 35 to 2 and at present Communist voters in many constituencies are supporting Left wing Socialist candidates. Of the seven million members of organized labor only nine thousand belong to the pro-Communist Congress of Industrial Unions (*San-Betsu*). Three million are affiliated with the General Council of Trade Unions (*Sohyo*), which backs the Left wing Socialists; 670 thousand with the Trade Union Congress (*Zenro*), supporter of the Right wing Socialists. Thus, while many unions take an independent attitude in politics, the major inclination of labor is toward the Left.

The conservative government must, therefore, pay heed to the neutralist sentiment which pervades labor and the Leftist parties. This is the more true in view of the increasing development of working relations between Japanese and foreign labor organizations and the shift of the Moscow line from anti-parliamentarianism to its former strategy of boring from within.

Factors in American-Japanese relations which condition the maintenance of co-operation are trade balance, loans, self-government in Okinawa, bomb-testing at Bikini, release of war crimes prisoners, and Japan's desire for less restricted trade with Communist China. Although Japan's exports reached a postwar high in 1955, ex-

ceeding 1954 by 27 per cent and 1955 imports by \$421 million, this favorable situation was due to American military procurement amounting to \$557 million. The figures for the six-year period 1950-1955 show an adverse merchandise trade balance of \$1,287 billion.

TRADE RELATIONS

Excluding military procurement, we sell three times as much in dollar value to Japan as Japan sells to us. Yet American manufacturers of cotton goods are calling for protection from Japanese textiles, declaring that they will be irreparably damaged unless quotas and higher tariffs are imposed upon competing imports. Figures presented to our House of Representatives by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in New York do not bear out this contention. These figures indicate that in 1955 our cotton textile production rose by 5 per cent over 1954 and that profits of textile and apparel firms rose by 88 per cent. Japanese textile imports were about one and one-half per cent of American production.

While it would seem that an overall view of our relations with Japan would call for public and private action to widen its markets here the actual result of American protests has been to restrict them. This has been done unilaterally by the government and textile industry of Japan.

The loan picture is more attractive though private investment has not yet responded to governmental encouragement. Substantial sums have been loaned by the Export-Import Bank on a short-term basis. The United States has made several agreements embodying reciprocal benefits during the past 12 months. These provide for the purchase of cotton and food grains of which we have an embarrassing surplus. Japan is to pay us in yen rather than dollars. We then loan the bulk of the amount thus received to Japan, to be used for economic development, and we expend the balance in Japan.

These arrangements have contributed toward enabling Japan to rebuild its economic strength, without which military security is a mere castle in the air. One aspect of the

rebuilding process has been the increase of Japanese investment in other states of Asia, also in South and Central America. The Japanese have found that their technical experts are aided in finding employment abroad if they are accompanied by investment of Japanese funds. Another, more striking, aspect has been the growth of the ship-building industry which has brought Japan to a place among the first three countries in that field.

The Ryukyu Islands, among which the largest and most important is Okinawa, are under American trusteeship. The Japanese regard this as temporary and hold that they have residual sovereignty, a justifiable inference from the Treaty of San Francisco (1951). Although China has an historical claim to the islands it has not been asserted within recent years. With the establishment of a native regime under the American governor the Ryukyuan people are asking for complete self-government. They are also greatly concerned lest the American administration take over 39 thousand acres of land in addition to the 42 thousand previously taken in Okinawa. In that event the trusteeship forces would have acquired a fourth of the island, which is densely populated. The Okinawans also insist that the land is worth ten times what we are paying for it. A congressional committee is investigating the issues involved and the Japanese government properly regards itself as a party in interest.

The Bikini bomb tests have had a very unfortunate effect in Japan, an effect which the 2 million dollars paid by this country to express our deep regret over the injury to fishermen due to fall-out has not counteracted. It has two aspects, one psychological, the other economic.

Bitter denunciations of American disregard of Japanese feelings appear alongside analyses of the problems of the fishing industry. Danger to health from contaminated fish and legal questioning of any nation's right to conduct atomic tests on the high seas are other hotly discussed topics which get little or no attention in our newspapers. It cannot be over-emphasized that unless greater care is taken in the conduct of fu-

ture tests this country is in danger of losing the confidence of even the friendly elements upon whom we depend for cooperation. (See *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Oct. 1955, pp. 289-292.)

The United States has supported Japan for membership in the United Nations. The U.S.S.R. has opposed this urgent Japanese desire which is a handy matter to bargain with in the current Soviet-Japanese conversations looking toward the long-delayed treaty of peace between them. We have opposed Japan's polite but persistent effort to obtain revision of the embargo on trade with China. This is an especially sore point, not only because Japan needs Chinese markets and minerals but because interference with policy toward even a suspected neighbor is irritating.

We appear to take a neutral stand regarding the so-called "Rhee Line" which, contrary to international law, bars non-Koreans from fishing in waters off the coasts of Korea. Hundreds of fishermen have been arrested and imprisoned by the South Korean government; and the Japanese catch in these waters has been much reduced.

Although our Security Treaty with Japan is not, strictly speaking, a treaty of alliance, our present relations with that great people recognize our need of one another and our firm determination to meet any apparent obstacles to continued friendship and mutual aid in a spirit of compromise. There is no likelihood of a turning away from the United States toward the U.S.S.R. Such danger as there may be of a weakening of Japan's confidence in us is implicit in our difficulty in understanding another people's culture and point of view.

In this era of nationalism in Asia it is of crucial importance that we overcome this obtuseness, both as a people and as a government. Let us not weigh Japan's need of us against our need of Japan. We need each other. Let the Japanese, who have kept their heads and risen courageously out of disastrous defeat, continue on their steady course, swayed by neither Rightist nor Leftist chauvinism. As equals and with mutual confidence Americans and Japanese can be a tremendous force for peace.

"If . . . war is not to be the means to the solution [of the East-West conflict] . . . then South Korea under the present circumstances is at best a questionable ally." Here is a program to "restore economic health and introduce political democracy to the Republic of Korea."

Korea: Partner For Freedom?

By Channing Liem

Associate Professor of Political Science, Chatham College

JULY, 1956, marks the completion of three years since the signing of the Korean truce. As the three year old bitter and costly war turned from hot to cold on July 27, 1953, President Eisenhower pledged the United States to a continued and relentless effort for the strengthening of South Korea economically as well as militarily and the peaceful unification of the whole of Korea.

To those ends the United States made an immediate grant for the ensuing year of \$252 million; concluded, soon thereafter, a Mutual Security Treaty with the Republic of Korea, recognizing an "armed attack on either as dangerous to the other . . . that the Republic of Korea grant and the United States accept the right to dispose the United States' land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea." The United Nations launched the Korean reconstruction program with a sum of \$139 million. To date the United States has kept up its aid to Korea at about the same rate as the sum expended in the first year following the Korean armistice.

It is fitting and appropriate at this point to examine the Korean balance sheet and see what achievements have been made; what, if any, are South Korea's deficiencies; and if

deficiencies there are, how they can be eliminated. An honest evaluation of her strengths and weaknesses and a search for a sound policy that will enable the realization of the aims enunciated by President Eisenhower are imperative. Otherwise she may collapse through her own weaknesses and enable communism to take peacefully what it could not take through war.

One finds, happily, in South Korea some significant gains made during and since the recent war. First, Koreans unanimously oppose communism. Before the war there had been some who lent sympathetic ears to the Communist promises. Today, however, having twice tasted life under communism, they are thoroughly fed up with it. All the Koreans with whom I have talked, assert that there are in South Korea no Communists or fellow travelers.

Secondly, Koreans are seasoned warriors for freedom who are also perfectly aware of the price of their newly-won independence. The Koreans have always been fanatical nationalists. Japan's determined effort to change them in the 40 years of her occupation of Korea proved useless. The fiery trial of the three year Korean war imbued them with the confidence that freedom can be preserved.

Thirdly, and most important, the Republic of Korea today has an army of over three quarters of a million men, superbly trained and with splendid morale. It is a formidable weapon against any would-be aggressors, and the Communists are well aware of that.

Those are the achievements of which Americans may well be proud, for had it not been for their prompt and resolute sup-

CHANNING LIEM, a native of Korea, is chairman of the basic course entitled "World Issues" at Chatham College. He was the Korean Affairs Adviser to the United States Military Governor in Korea, 1948-49, and a Ford Faculty Fellow, 1954-55. He is author of America's Finest Gift to Korea and several articles on the Far East.

port, the Republic of Korea could not have survived. Former President Truman in his *Memoirs* quotes General MacArthur as reporting a little over 24 hours after the North Korean attack on the South had begun, "A complete collapse of South Korea is imminent," and writes: "There was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once, if it was not to be overrun."

Both Thomas E. Dewey, titular head of the Republican Party and the Republican leaders of Congress gave their full support.¹ W. Averell Harriman, following his interview with General MacArthur on August 6, 1950, reported the latter as saying that Truman's decision to go to the aid of South Korea was magnificent and historic.²

INFLATION

Unfortunately, one also finds weaknesses in the Republic of Korea which threaten to nullify all the gains mentioned above. First of these is the steady deterioration of South Korean economy. Despite the large sums of money expended by the United States and United Nations, it has failed to make the expected recovery. On December 31, 1955, the editorial of Kyung Hyang Press, conservative Korean Catholic newspaper stated: "To put it in simple language, the departing year leaves behind some of the most painful problems unsolved. . . . Economically, it was one of the stormiest ever; acute depression on the one hand and the threats of runaway inflation on the other mercilessly rock the ship of nation."

The December issue of *Korean Survey*, a ROK government-supported periodical published in the United States, expressed a similar view: "Inflation (in Korea) continued to rise dangerously. Permanent productive facilities have continued to be postponed, with the result that the long-range economic outlook for Korea has improved but little." Other reports from Korea may be summed up thus: the people have no jobs and no money, but prices continue to soar.

What caused the ominous situation? President Syngman Rhee and his supporters

claim that the division of Korea and the Korean truce are responsible for it. The editorial of the *Korean Survey* echoes this view by attributing it to "the uncertainties of international situation," meaning the refusal of the United States and United Nations to denounce the Korean truce and resume the war.

There is no doubt that the division of the country and the resultant loss by South Korea of vital raw materials constitute a serious blow to the South Korean economy. Lacking in oil and rubber and deficient in coal, iron, timber and other critical raw materials, her recovery is a staggering task indeed. It is agreed by all that the division of Korea must be brought to an end at the earliest possible moment, and it is to that end the United States has pledged its effort. American economic and military aid to South Korea is to help make that possible.

What concerns both Americans and Koreans most is that despite the United States aid which covered not only the economic losses through the division of Korea but also the technical know-how, the result fell far short of their expectations. The United States supplied approximately 55 per cent of the 1954-1955 ROK budget, and yet South Korea's economy has steadily worsened. Gordon Walker, Chief Correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor* in the Far East, wrote in the June 8, 1955, issue of the newspaper:

United States government agencies in South Korea have come out with an exceptionally strong denunciation of corruption, deliberate sabotage, and general lack of cooperation on the part of the Syngman Rhee government in connection with the administration of the United States aid in that country.

The attack is contained in a document summarizing complaints made by local representatives of the Foreign Operations Administration, the State Department and the Far East Command. . . .

It charges that corruption and inexperience are the norm within government. It charges the government with delays in instituting legislative reforms required, and adds that there is waste inherent in the half-hearted manner in which ROK implementation has proceeded. . . . Observers who have watched the progress of the United States aid program in South Korea mean-

¹ *Memoirs* by Harry S. Truman, 1956, Doubleday, Vol. II, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, p. 350.

while are not surprised by the report which merely summarizes a situation that has been steadily deteriorating for the past year. . . .

The feeling throughout the ranks of almost all United States government personnel in Korea has been that the aid program is being seriously subverted; that the intended beneficiaries—the Korean people—have not received what was intended by the American taxpayers who foot the bill.

A Korean analyst of South Korean economic ills finds that the United States aid policy is not without some faults. Tongwook Lee, member of the editorial board of *Dong-A Daily* in Seoul, observes for instance, that the United States policy of requiring South Korea to purchase American products such as coal and exporting United States surplus goods has resulted in wastefulness. His main criticism, however, is directed against the ROK government:

The aforementioned weaknesses of the Korean people; lack of capital, technical skill and administrative know-how—are not peculiar to us. They are common to all underdeveloped countries. However, they can be quickly acquired under a competent governmental leadership. Our government sadly disappoints us in this. To cite but one example, one of Korea's most urgent needs following the truce was the manufacture of textile goods. The UNKRA, realizing the need for it, promptly approved the project. But the ROK government's Department of Commerce took one year granting license to applying firms and spent another year converting the aid fund into Korean currency. How can one expect to recover in our country when our officials and politicians are so inefficient and corrupt?³

Despite the basic limitations of South Korea's economy, competent students of economy agree that with adequate aid from the United States, under careful planning and wise administration of the recovery program, South Korea can be restored to a position of sufficient strength. Then the Republic of Korea can successfully compete with North Korea and ultimately persuade the Reds to agree to the unification of the two zones. One of the most penetrating analyses of the economic realities of South Korea is contained in a recent report prepared by John P. Lewis for the United States National Planning Commission. In his recommenda-

tion for a five-year recovery program for South Korea, the Indiana University professor and a former UNKRA official, betrays no pessimism concerning the future prospects of the country. His principal warnings are that it be conducted on a long-term systematic basis and that it be administered efficiently.

To sum up, there is a basic conflict between the ROK government on the one hand and the U. N. and the United States on the other—on how to solve the Korean problem. The former believes that the unification of Korea through military means is the only solution and regards the prospects of satisfactory economic recovery in South Korea without unification as unattainable.

The latter, believing that the resumption of the Korean War will not only bring destruction to the Korean peninsula but set the whole world on fire, maintain that peaceful unification is the only practical solution. Believing too, that South Korea's economic health is prerequisite to the realization of peaceful unification, the United States and the United Nations have given immense sums of money, but the ROK government has failed to bring about the anticipated results.

Another deficiency to be found in the Republic of Korea is its diplomatic isolation. At the present time, with the exception of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek's government on Formosa, South Korea has no friend. Even with the United States the relationship is far from cordial. President Syngman Rhee is bitter against the Eisenhower government for the latter's agreement to the Korean truce. Four months after the conclusion of the Korean truce, he said on his visit in Formosa: "I am not bluffing. We must march to the Yalu to fight whether against Chinese or Russian."⁴

He has not altered his view since. He failed to get along with United States ambassadors accredited to his government. It is widely suspected in Korea that the United States' failure to appoint a new envoy since the recall of its last ambassador, Mr. Lacey, is America's polite expression of displeasure with Rhee.

³ "SAI PYOK", Sept. 1955, Seoul, pp. 33-34.

⁴ Quoted in *The Far East*, Claude A. Buss, Macmillan, 1955, p. 671-72.

In the eyes of all the neutral nations in Asia and Africa and all the nations in Europe, the Republic of Korea today is virtually a pariah. Not even the mightiest of nations can afford to remain long in such isolation. It must be remembered that the Republic of Korea owes its rebirth and survival to date to these nations of the free world.

DICTATORSHIP

Still another, and perhaps the most serious, weakness of South Korea is its dictatorship. There are, to be sure, those who view the Rhee government with sympathy. They contend, with good reason, that South Korea in the present critical stage needs a strong and stable government. No conscientious person would wish to see an unstable government established there.

A strong government, however, is not necessarily a stable government. The South Korean government is more than a strong government; it is a dictatorial government. But ironically enough, it is one of the most unstable and irresponsible governments in existence today. The average life-span of the cabinet members and sub-cabinet members of the ROK government is around a half year.

A number of government officials whom the ROK government has sent abroad for further training in the fields of their responsibilities have found out later that they will no longer hold their positions upon their return. The only office that has been continually occupied by the same person is that of the President. At a recent investigation of alleged government irregularities involving a Tai Chang Textile Manufacturing Corporation by a special committee of the National Assembly, practically every one of the officials called before it offered the same excuse: what he had done was on "special orders from above."⁵

In South Korea national policies are decided not according to the freely expressed popular will or following a public discussion, but solely by the President. His will is the will of the nation and anyone who dissents from it is branded as a "traitor." When

the Eisenhower government was negotiating for the Korean truce in 1953, a Korean political leader dared to say that while he was not happy about it, he felt that Korea must bow to the will of the whole world, because to defy it would be suicidal. Shortly afterward a band of "patriotic" youths attacked him, severely wounding him. Early in 1955, General Maxwell Taylor, commander of the U.N. forces in Korea was attacked by a Korean fanatic, "because" the latter asserted, "the General refused to reunify Korea."

Today the ROK constitution is a mere scrap of paper. In 1950, shortly before the North Koreans attacked the South, the Seoul government was all set to shelve its constitution and "indefinitely postpone" the election of the legislators, but changed the plan only on the urgent advice of the government of the United States. In 1953, it forced through the National Assembly an amendment to the constitution through wholesale arrests and intimidations of the assemblymen. The constitution had vested the power of electing the President in the Assembly, and it was apparent to all that the National Assembly lacked confidence in the President.

Later—in 1954—the government decided again to "amend" the constitution, because it had restricted the Presidency to two terms. Through the usual strong-arm tactics and subterfuge it went about lining up supporters for the "amendment," and when the government felt confident of the outcome, it introduced the bill to the National Assembly, exempting the first President (Syngman Rhee) from constitutional restriction.

To the dismay of the government supporters, however, the bill failed to receive the necessary two-thirds of the votes. The government lost by a half vote, and the despairing Rhee supporters sent this sad news to him. But the President declared the bill "passed," because he said, "according to the mathematical practice, .5 is equivalent to 1." He signed the bill into "law."

From the foregoing analysis one can only deduce these conclusions. Should it be the view of the Free World that war was the only and best solution of the so-called East-West conflict, the Republic of Korea could

⁵ Reported in *Dong-A Daily*, April 30, 1955.

indeed play an important role in the struggle. Its huge manpower consisting of twenty-one million die-hard anti-Communists, its 750 thousand man battle-seasoned armed forces and its dictatorial government will prove an invaluable asset to the war effort.

If, however, it decides that war is not to be the means to the solution as it has clearly indicated, then South Korea under the present circumstances is at best a questionable ally. It lacks those qualifications which are vitally necessary in the successful waging of a peaceful offensive. Its government, saddled with corrupt and inefficient officials, is helpless to cope with mounting economic chaos. Headed by a man whose will is the law, the ROK government has gained notoriety as being dictatorial among a half billion non-Communist Asians.

Hence, if the United States intends to save South Korea and check Communist imperialism in Asia, it must take positive steps—and soon—to restore economic health and introduce political democracy to the Republic of Korea. The Koreans are well aware of this and at this writing the Presidential campaign is under way in Korea. The opposition candidates are desperately struggling under the slogan, "Let's have a change, or we will perish!" All observers admit, nevertheless, that except by a supermiracle Syngman Rhee will be elected, and that prospects for the future are dim.

Isn't there some way to turn the tide toward the better? There is, and I submit the following six-point program, convinced that it merits serious consideration by all who sincerely desire freedom and peace.

1) The United States, instead of assuming the sole responsibility for Korea, should recommend that the United Nations adopt a Four-Year Systematic Economic Rehabilitation Program for Korea at an estimated cost of \$1.2 billion.

2) The United States should pledge one billion dollars toward the cost and request the other U.N. members to contribute the remaining \$200 million.

3) The Program should be directed by a Supreme Administrator of the United Nations Korean Economic Rehabilitation Pro-

gram (UNKERP), who should be nominated by the United States and appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. He should be an American citizen of proven competence who enjoys the confidence of the public, and his supreme aim should be the economic rehabilitation of South Korea.

4) He should have complete authority over the UNKERP as General MacArthur and his successors had over all the U.N. forces in Korea, including the ROK forces. He should be responsible only to the President of the United States and the U.N. General Assembly.

5) He should have the power to select his own personnel. While he should seek the cooperation of the ROK government, he should have final authority.

6) Simultaneously with it, the United Nations should earnestly and vigorously press the Soviets and the Mao Tse-tung regime for a peaceful unification of Korea. With the Soviet leaders busy representing themselves as peace messengers, now is the time for the Free World to launch a peaceful counteroffensive. It will be difficult to ignore such an offensive.

Although some modification in the details may be necessary, the soundness and advantages of the program outlined above are obvious. First, it is only logical that the Korean campaign should remain the concern of the U.N. in its cold as well as hot war stage. Secondly, while enabling the United States to retain the necessary control over the program, it at the same time robs the anti-American critics of the argument that the United States is pursuing an imperialistic policy in Korea.

Thirdly, such a drastic program alone will take the administration of the program out of the incompetent hands of the ROK government and insure its success. Lastly, when the rank and file of the Korean people enjoy the minimum economic security, they will refuse to be intimidated by the unscrupulous politicians into surrendering their democratic rights. Thus they will make the Republic of Korea an object of admiration among the people of Asia.



"Contact with a great variety of Indonesians of many different backgrounds over a long stretch of time has convinced this writer while there may be considerable admiration for the technological achievements of the United States and a desire to emulate these, far stronger is the conscious rejection of what are believed to be the dominant American cultural characteristics. . . ."

Indonesia: Search For Stability

By Justus M. van der Kroef

Author of INDONESIA IN THE MODERN WORLD

IN the six and a half years since the Dutch transferred their sovereignty over the East Indian islands to the Indonesian government, foreign observers have on more than one occasion wondered whether the fledgling Republic would be able to survive the economic decline, administrative confusion and political unbalance evident in most of the period. Despite slow if significant advances in education, social welfare and some facets of industrial development, Indonesia has in these years often veered so close to anarchy, warlordism and financial collapse as to cause the deepest concern among her friends.

In the past year, however, there have been important indications of a new and more hopeful departure in national affairs. At the same time old problems have been accentuated by a different political context, although the means of resolving them appear more promising now than at any time in the past.

A year ago, in July, 1955, the tottering and corruption-ridden cabinet of Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo returned its mandate in the

midst of an army cabal that had arisen over the defense minister's attempt to appoint an army chief of staff, who was unacceptable to a majority of the army's territorial commanders. In the background was the long-smouldering conflict over army reorganization, resentment of the defense minister's other policies, the widespread dissatisfaction over the corruption and economic retrogression of the country and the suspicion of undue Communist influence in the Ali cabinet.

The new government, led by Premier Burhanuddin Harahap, vigorously undertook a program of reform¹ and succeeded in placating the army command. It proved less successful in settling a command dispute in the Republic's embryo air force a few months later, and failed to come to an amicable settlement with the Netherlands over the abolition of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and over the problem of Irian (West New Guinea), held by the Dutch but claimed by Indonesia.

But most significant of all was the completion under the tenure of the Harahap cabinet of Indonesia's first general election. On September 29, 1955, some 40 million Indonesians (about 70 per cent of the total electorate) cast their ballots for more than a thousand candidates. These represented over 150 national and regional parties, which competed for the 260 seats in the new national legislature. On December 15, thereafter, voting began for the 520 seats in a

J. M. VAN DER KROEF was born and educated in Indonesia. He formerly taught at Michigan State University and plans to return shortly to Indonesia for further study. He is the author of Dutch Policy in Indonesia, and Indonesia in the Modern World. Indonesian Social Evolution: Some Psychological Considerations will be published this fall.

¹ On the Harahap regime see J. M. van der Kroef, "A New Course in Indonesia," *International Journal* (Toronto), Spring, 1956.

constituent assembly, which will draft Indonesia's permanent constitution. While instances of fraud, mismanagement and intimidation of voters detract from complete accuracy of the election results, it seems clear that these results in general mirror the political wishes of Indonesian voters. In March, 1956, Ali Sastroamidjojo again became premier in a coalition cabinet that included representatives of the three major parties, but barred the Communists.

The staging of the often postponed election was in itself a dramatic achievement and its results were in many ways surprising. For one thing political opinion clearly crystalized around four major parties which together won about 80 per cent of the votes cast; as if with one stroke scores of political groups, some of which had played a significant role in the appointed pre-election legislature, virtually lost all reason for existence. In some respects this reduction in the number of parties marks a solid advance toward political stability, while at the same it affords evidence of a growing tendency on the part of Indonesians to think in national, instead of regional or local political, terms.

The *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (National Indonesian Party—P.N.I.) emerged as the victor in the election, closely followed by the *Masjumi* (Muslim Federation) Party. In third and fourth place respectively were the *Nahdatul Ulama* (Muslim Schoolmen's Association—N.U.) and the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party—P.K.I.). Roughly, the P.N.I. polled 8.2 million votes and obtained 57 seats in the new parliament; Masjumi got 8 million votes and the same number of seats; N.U. obtained about 6.8 million votes and 45 seats, and the Communists 6.3 million votes and 39 seats. A fusion with smaller parties raised P.N.I.'s total number of seats to 59, Masjumi's to 58.

Noteworthy was the small success of such parties as the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (Indonesia Socialist Party—P.S.I.), which only obtained 5 seats, of the P.S.I.I. (another Muslim group) which got 7, and of the Christian and Catholic parties (8 and 6 seats), all of which had played a significant role in political life prior to the actual voting.

What do these results mean? With some qualifications they may be fairly interpreted as a defeat for the avowedly pro-Western, moderately nationalistic and more liberal segment of Indonesian parties, and as a victory for the forces of an ultra nationalism that occasionally borders on xenophobia, and for the ultra conservative and "nativistic" Islamic orientation in the country. The Masjumi Party, generally if mildly pro-Western and openly anti-Communist, represents middle class Islamic modernism and rationalism (not unmixed with socialistic ingredients) as well as important aspects of intellectual life, and is moderately nationalistic in outlook. It did not achieve the election victory that most observers expected.

The ultra nationalistic P.N.I. comprised much of the old nationalist leadership, but it was dissension ridden and stigmatized by the corruption that had become rife under the first cabinet of P.N.I. leader Ali Sastroamidjojo. It was generally believed to have greatly lost in strength and appeal; yet in the crucial provinces of Central and East Java, where about half of all election votes were cast in September, the P.N.I. scored a resounding victory and ran more than a million votes ahead of Masjumi.

These two provinces are the ancient heartland of Javanese culture. If it is noted that Masjumi scored resounding successes in almost all districts on the islands beyond Java, it is difficult to gainsay the conclusion that the P.N.I. has emerged primarily as a party of the Javanese, and of a frequently reactionary Javanism in particular. In view of the potent cultural differences between the various ethnic groups in Indonesia, differences that have led to political particularism and armed secessionism, the "Java centered" character of the P.N.I. may become increasingly significant in the future.

Equally surprising has been the strong showing of the N.U., a conservative Islamic group originally founded in 1915. During the Japanese occupation this was part of Masjumi but in 1952 it broke away. Just as Masjumi is primarily a forum of modern, Western-inspired and rationalistic trends in Islam, so N.U. represents an ultra orthodox, legalistic Islamic orientation, influenced moreover by traditional Indonesian folkways.

The Communist Party ran more or less as expected, accumulating a sizable vote particularly in agriculturally depressed areas and in the regions of the big Western-owned estates with their large groups of rural proletarians. In terms of election programs there was little difference between the P.N.I. and the P.K.I. Both stressed their virulent hatred of colonialism, their undaunted nationalism, their insistence on "Indonesian ways." Viewed together, the P.N.I., P.K.I. and N.U. constitute, to amplify an Indonesian newspaper's election analysis,² "a bulwark against all manner of modernisms that are feared," a conclusion that is given added support also by the lack of success of the P.S.I. This more than any other group in Indonesia represents anti-Communist intellectuals, rational, skeptical and cosmopolitan in outlook.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The parliamentary elections have tended to overshadow the importance of the balloting for the members of the constituent assembly which is to convene shortly. Unjustly so, because the constituent assembly's work may well nullify that of the legislature. Both are to be operative concurrently for some time to come and conflicts between them are sure to occur. (Unfortunately, the legal position of these two bodies toward each other has hardly been regulated.) For it is the constituent assembly which will be confronted with the major structural problems of the Indonesian Republic. The results of the election for the constituent assembly paralleled those for the legislature; the total number of votes cast in the assembly election was far less than those cast in the elections for the legislature and the P.N.I.'s victory was perhaps more complete in the former.

The significance of the assembly election result lies in the conflict between the four leading parties on a number of questions of governmental organization. The major parties are agreed on the function of the presidency. They desire a president who is the functioning head of the executive branch and is responsible to the legislature (more

or less along United States lines); instead of a "passive," politically inviolable president (as in France). The P.N.I. and the P.K.I. desire a unicameral legislature primarily reflecting numerical representation (this would benefit these two groups in view of their strength in populous Java); Masjumi and N.U., however, favor a bicameral legislature, with an upper house representing regional interests, an arrangement that would be of particular benefit to Masjumi with its great strength on the islands beyond Java.

But the divergent opinions on the structure of the legislature touch on even more fundamental problems in Indonesian life. Mention has already been made of the potent forces of ethnic separatism in Indonesia, reflecting the country's heterogeneous cultural patterns. There is also a not inconsiderable amount of historical experience in Indonesia (much of it drawn from colonial sources) with "federal" administration and local conciliar structures of government. Arraigned against these are the dynamics of a levelling egalitarian nationalism, expressed in the form of a highly centralized "mass" democracy.

No harmony has as yet been achieved between these two forces and much of the instability and unrest in Indonesia today is attributable to this unbalance. Anomalies in local government abound. In some areas such typically "colonial" administrative units as the "residencies" are still in force; elsewhere they are not. There are more than 250 areas with some measure of autocratic princely self-government, some with a restive population clamoring for democratic channels of local government. Some cities have active councils; many have not.

An appointed and highly centralized civil bureaucracy operates at a variety of administrative levels, while in the villages or complexes of villages a more or less democratically elected local leadership prevails, increasingly responsive to local public pressures. Conflicts between these two channels of authority are legion, but most pernicious of all is the virtual absence of meaningful bodies of local government at the provincial and regency level. Efforts to enact a comprehensive local government law have been

² *Nieuwsgier* (Djakarta), October 4, 1955.

made, but with little concrete success so far. It is clear that the constituent assembly has a leading role to play in founding the basis of local government.

ROLE OF ISLAM

Other principal issues confront the drafters of the Indonesian Constitution. There is for example, the question of the relative influence to be accorded to Islamic law in the constitutional framework of the state. Here too, two opposing tendencies are at work. On the one hand there is the indubitable strength of organized Islam and the demands of virtually all Muslim political groups that the Indonesian state either be based on "Islamic principles" (Masjumi) or in effect become something close to a Muslim theocracy, with exclusive recognition of the Shafi'itic branch of Islamic law (N.U.).

On the other hand such parties as the P.N.I. and the P.K.I. resolutely favor a secular state, without an official religion (though with due recognition of the desirability of "belief in God"). The division is by no means clear cut; modern minded Muslims of the Masjumi are less extreme in their demand for favored treatment of their faith by the state than the orthodox Muslim schoolmen and their rural followers who make up the rank and file of N.U.

There is no denying, however, that this issue penetrates deeply into Indonesian culture patterns and folkways. The conflict between Islam and indigenous values and folk laws is widespread and of long standing in Indonesia; indeed, in some parts of the country (e.g., West Sumatra, East and Central Java, South Sulawesi) the social distance and latent conflict between those who regard themselves as faithful followers of the Prophet, and those who are more inclined to look to non-Islamic and autochthonous folk traditions for guidance in daily life is disturbing, even dangerous.

The political instability and economic disorganization of recent years have tended to aggravate this conflict and the drafters of a permanent Indonesian constitution will not be able to evade it. In the last analysis the solution of these profound dichotomies

in Indonesian life depends on the recognition of the truth of an old and frequently maligned colonial theme: that Indonesia is still a nation of nations, a people of peoples, each with its own cultural milieu, some "primitive", some "advanced"; as one Indonesian literatus has put it "The Asian peoples live in thirty centuries at once."³

Perhaps the most important sociological consequence of Indonesia's national development in the past few years lies in just this field, in the recognition and development of sectional group consciousness and particularized interest of those living in a single democratic state. This applies not only to indigenous population groups, but also to foreign minorities like the Chinese, Arabs and to those of European descent. Special seats have been reserved for these minority groups in the legislature and in the constituent assembly. Those familiar with the post-revolutionary plight of the Eurasian minority in Indonesia see encouraging signs in the intense interest taken by this group in the elections, as evidenced, for example, in the formation of such new election coordinating bodies as the *Badan Kontak Perwakilan Golongan Ketjil Europah* (Contact organization of representatives of the European minority), and of other minority political groups.

That Indonesian leaders have exhibited a special knack for avoiding head-on conflicts and a consistency in their refusal to drive a domestic issue to its extremes, few would deny. This tendency toward compromise, so typical of the Indonesian character, has more than once miraculously saved the country from civil war. Great faith seems to be placed in the healing qualities of time and in the slow formation of precedent.

To this tendency must be added the often extraordinary self-control of some political leaders not to exploit their opponent's pitfalls in times of crisis. All this has greatly benefited the state in these turbulent first years of its independence. But it has also meant that many pressing issues still hang fire (e.g., enactment of a law governing foreign agrarian and mining enterprise) and

³ Takdir Alisjahbana in *Konfrontasi* (Djakarta), April-May, 1955.

that conflicts of authority seem to persist (e.g., as in the relationship between the military high command and the executive branch of the government).

The lack of unequivocal action has also brought rifts in the country's top leadership. The clash in the air force command, which led to a public fist fight among its members on the occasion of the installation of its vice chief of staff last December, not only demonstrated the lack of discipline on many levels of the Republic's armed forces, but also seems to have brought the long smoldering conflict between Vice-President Mohammad Hatta and President Sukarno, both the "grand old men" of the Revolution, into the open.

In a sense this conflict runs through the whole of Indonesian life, Sukarno representing the sweeping temper of mass action and revolutionary nationalism, Hatta reflecting a more skeptical, élite minded, intellectual current in political thought. Shortly after the air force incident, in which Hatta and Sukarno found themselves at odds over the problem of disciplining recalcitrant air force officers, the independent daily *Indonesia Raja* reported that Hatta was soon to resign, possibly with a view of running against Sukarno for the presidency.

Earlier the same paper had run a poll among its readers and reported that Hatta was favored over Sukarno for the presidency by two and a half to one, though no actual figures were given. A few years ago a political contest between Sukarno and Hatta would have been unthinkable, but today a new temper of self-criticism has emerged as one of the most hopeful signs along the road to political maturity.

The new, second cabinet of Premier Ali Sastroamidjojo badly needs this sense of maturity. Indonesia's economy is still recovering from the mismanagement and fiscal crises under Ali's first tenure as prime minister (1953-1955). The caretaker Harahap government, though severely hampered by the temporary nature of its mandate, was nevertheless able to implement much needed reforms, halt the spiral of inflation, improve the budgetary deficits, weed out corruption in the import-export sector of the economy, and initiate stabilizing controls.⁴

Thanks to a greater steadiness in the world market price of Indonesia's major exports like rubber, tea, coprah and tin, 1955 showed a marked export advance over the two previous years, not the least because of increased trade with Iron Curtain nations. But the problem of accelerating the country's industrial development still awaits a solution, as population pressures inexorably increase year by year. The dependence of Indonesia on countries willing to invest sizable sums for long range expansion programs is as great as ever.

Moreover, there are indications that Indonesia is lagging behind in supplying herself with qualified technicians, even though her school system has grown enormously and illiteracy has been reduced to about 50 per cent. Bandung's technical college, the country's chief modern engineering school, which in 1920 had only 20 students, now has 2000, but in the past 10 years the school has produced only 7 or 8 graduate engineers annually.

Although medical facilities, especially in the rural areas, have greatly expanded, Indonesia's chief medical schools have in the past few years only graduated on the average about 25 physicians per year and the ratio of doctors per heads of population is one of the lowest in any country of the world, 1 per 68,000 (as compared, e.g., with 1 physician per 6,300 head of population in India), while the number of hospital beds per 1000 head of population is only 0.8. In addition to a high incidence of such diseases as t.b. and framboesia, relatively "new" (for Indonesia) diseases like polio are exacting an increasing number of victims. In view of budgetary unbalances and the wavering course of the economy, it becomes apparent that in the sector of social welfare development also, heavy reliance upon monetary and technical assistance from abroad will remain a long-term necessity.

EXTREMIST ACTION

While these factors are important deterrents to that broad process of rapidly accelerating development so ardently looked for by Indonesian leaders, perhaps no ob-

⁴ *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia* (Djakarta), January, 1956, pp. 2-75.

stacle is so difficult to overcome as the instability of temper and the popular proclivity to seek solutions of public problems by the espousal of an extremist course of action that plague the country. Only one aspect of this problem is the continued terrorism and banditry in a number of areas of Indonesia, from Aceh in North Sumatra to the Moluccas in Eastern Indonesia. Economic discontent, individual and social frustration and disorganization, and religio-political fanaticism all play a role here, and there can be little question of the havoc caused by continuing bandit activity, despite vigorous pacifying action.

In the year 1955, to cite a recent press report (*Java Bode*, Djakarta, January 14, 1956), in the province of West-Java alone, 28 civilians were killed, 172 cases of arson occurred with a loss of 461 homes; the total losses suffered by the population exceeded 24 million Rupiah (about \$2 million United States), or more than 60 thousand Rupiah per day. In Central Java province 244 persons lost their lives at the hands of extremists and more than 600 thousand were evacuated. Three million Rupiah were lost, not counting personal property like houses, cattle and so on.

In large areas of Northern Sumatra and South Sulawesi the government has little or no control. Post-revolutionary fanaticism, often channeled along the lines of a blind xenophobia, also plagues the cities, as indicated by the recent mob attacks on the Dutch language daily, *Vrije Pers* (Free Press), and the *Chinese Daily News*, both in the city of Surabaya. It also has made a mockery of justice out of the trials of Dutchmen accused of subversive activities. The most famous of these, the trial of L. N. H. Jungschläger, who recently died before a verdict could be reached, has aroused international indignation. The teeming urban mass of Djakarta has more than once given evidence of its susceptibility to hysterical manipulation. Yet many Indonesian political leaders remain believers in the virtues of ever greater mass demonstrations to arouse popular support for desired political objectives.

It is therefore unfortunate that those Western nations which have most to gain

from the emergence of a stable and friendly Indonesia tend to persist in policies that endanger their own interests in the country. One illustration is the Netherlands, which for more than five years now has been involved in a dispute with Indonesia over Dutch-held Irian (West New Guinea). Dutch refusal to recognize Indonesia's claim on the area and Dutch reluctance to submit the dispute to international arbitration continue to poison the relations between the two countries and contributed to the most recent failure of Indonesian-Dutch negotiations in the Hague and Geneva from December, 1955 to February, 1956.

Because of many divergent interests between the two partners, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, created at the time Indonesia formally obtained her independence from the Dutch in December, 1949, proved unworkable almost from its inception. As early as 1952 there was discussion of the possibility of dissolving the Union, with its complex financial and economic agreement between the countries. In 1954, after prolonged negotiations, the two governments agreed to a protocol dissolving the Union and abrogating some of the economic agreements thereunto attached. Other agreements insured much of the preferred Dutch economic position in Indonesia.

Since both parties failed fully to ratify the protocol, new negotiations began in December, 1955. Again initial agreement was reached on the fundamental issues pertaining to the dissolution of the Union itself and its financial and economic clauses, but the conference broke up in failure because no agreement could be reached on the temporary method of settling disputes, as laid down in the exchange of letters to be attached to the dissolution protocol itself. This temporary method referred to the creation of a body of arbitration composed of an equal number of members appointed by both sides to settle disputes between the two countries pending the drawing up of a permanent regulation.

The Dutch government termed the Indonesian proposals "vague" (also admitted by Indonesian delegate Anak Agung) and "conducive to controversy." The Dutch had proposed earlier that the temporary arbitration

regulation would only apply to financial and economic agreements and that the President of the International Court of Justice would be asked to name the members of the arbitration commission in the event one of the two countries failed to select a member country for the commission. This proposal was voluntarily withdrawn by the Dutch because of Indonesian objections that it limited Indonesia's "sovereign rights"; moreover, as Anak Agung subsequently declared, at issue here was only a temporary regulation of disputes, a "watertight" regulation might take from three to six months to draft.

It seems clear that the legalistic view taken by the Dutch of the Indonesian arbitration proposal was prompted not in the least by a fear that by means of it the Irian dispute between the two countries could be submitted to an arbitration commission composed of foreign countries. In the past few years the Dutch have consistently taken the view that the Irian issue is a matter that does not concern the rest of the world, and for that reason the Dutch also refused to acknowledge the right of the United Nations to take cognizance of the dispute.

In Indonesia, meanwhile, there had been considerable opposition to the holding of any conference with the Netherlands whatsoever, and two parties that originally supported the Harahap cabinet withdrew from the government because they could not agree to the principle of holding the negotiations in the first place. In consequence, the Harahap regime may well have been driven into a more and more uncompromising stand. After the breakdown of the Geneva Conference, the Harahap government announced on February 16, 1956, that it had unilaterally abrogated the Netherlands Indonesian Union and that the future relationship between the two countries would be one of complete "freedom," i.e.,

that Indonesia would consider Dutch holdings in the country in a new light.

In this whole dispute the position of the United States is rather ambiguous. A recent pronouncement of Secretary of State Dulles has been interpreted by the Dutch as American support for Indonesia's claim on Irian; yet in Indonesia the United States' position in the dispute is generally regarded as being one of unwarranted neutrality, and as a contradiction of the Eden-Eisenhower Washington Declaration with its endorsement of the rights of self-determination for colonial peoples.

The distrust of the United States in Indonesia is profound, and no whirlwind visit by the Secretary of State is apt to dispel it. For this distrust finds its origin not merely in a possible misunderstanding of American foreign policy aims, but, more basically, in a rejection of much of the dominant social and cultural patterns of American life. Contact with a great variety of Indonesians of many different backgrounds over a long stretch of time has convinced this writer that while there may be considerable admiration for the technological achievements of the United States and a desire to emulate these, far stronger is the conscious rejection of what are believed to be the dominant American cultural characteristics, e.g., the rootlessness, coarse materialism and unlovely institutionalized conformities of its modern industrial society. The well-mannered, crew-cutted earnestness of American diplomatic emissaries in Southeast Asia, cannot, from this point of view, overcome the tragic dilemmas that confront them and that have been so strikingly portrayed in Graham Greene's *The Quiet American*. One can only hope that in time and with advancement in governmental and fiscal stability this distrust may give way to a more balanced appreciation.

"Intelligent self-interest demands that the United States protect those regions chilled by the winds blowing upon them from the totalitarian world."

Vietnam: Our Outpost In Asia

By Thomas E. Ennis

Professor of Modern European and Asian History, West Virginia University

THREE recent wars have left three lands divided. The Second World War brought forth a West and an East Germany. The Korean War ended with a South and a North Korea. The Indo-Chinese War produced a South and a North Vietnam. In these three countries the peoples striving to remain free confront those shackled to the juggernaut of the enslaved.

The least known of these areas where divide and rule is etched in deep grooves, is Vietnam. In the south, at Saigon, is the government of Washington's ally, Ngo-dinh-Diem. In the north, at Hanoi, is the regime of Ho Chi-minh, Moscow's agent.

Ngo-dinh-Diem, born in 1901 at Quang Binh (Central Vietnam), is associated with one of the oldest Roman Catholic families in the peninsula. His father, Ngo-dinh-Kha, minister and adviser of Emperor Thanh Thai, is known as the creator of a new type of teaching based upon a synthesis of Oriental and Occidental cultures. His eldest brother, Ngo-dinh-Khai, a nationalist leader, was killed by the Communists in 1945. An-

other brother is Bishop Ngo-dinh-Thuc.

Ngo-dinh-Diem advanced rapidly as an administrator and provincial governor. He was appointed Minister of the Interior at the age of 32. He took a strong stand against French control and demanded more democratic participation for his countrymen in public affairs. His views were not popular with the French and, in protest, he resigned.

After the surrender of the Japanese and the coming to power of the Communists (Viet Minh), the patriotic bodies of South Vietnam authorized Ngo-dinh-Diem to represent them at Hanoi in the revolutionary anti-French movement. He was arrested by the Communists and taken to an unhealthy forest retreat in North Vietnam, to be released in January, 1946, when the Communists posed as a "national" government and made a gesture to dissolve the Communist Party.

When war broke out in December, 1946, between France and the Viet Minh, Ngo-dinh-Diem opposed both factions. The lonely patriot visited Europe and the United States in 1950, hoping to gain support for the independence of his country. He resided between 1951 and 1953 at Maryknoll Junior Seminary, Lakewood, New Jersey, and made futile trips to Washington, sitting in the outer offices of members of Congress and officials of the State Department.

Disappointed at the unswerving governmental acceptance of the French position, Ngo-dinh-Diem journeyed to Belgium where he hid himself in a monastery. During the Battle of Dienbienphu, feeling that conditions favored his cause, he moved into a Paris garret. The French, desperate to find some one to share the sting of defeat, offered

Author of French Policy and Developments in Indochina, THOMAS E. ENNIS is professor of Modern European and Asian History, West Virginia University. In 1950, he served on the General Staff in Intelligence, Washington, D. C. Mr. Ennis spent several years in the Far East as bureau manager of Sino-American News Agency and later as assistant bureau manager of United Press, Peking. He also held the position of research consultant with Military Intelligence during the Second World War.

him the post of premier (June 15, 1954). The new premier bravely urged, "all patriots to set aside party, religion, sect, or class distinctions to help save our country from injustice, oppression, and all forms of slavery."

The first months of the Ngo-dinh-Diem leadership were not auspicious. Premier Mendés-France was willing to give the Communists many concessions in order to end the war in Indo-China. During the negotiations leading to the signing of the Geneva Agreements, Ngo-dinh-Diem was not consulted. There was not one native battalion loyal to the infant regime. The treasury was empty.

About 85 per cent of the villages had no contacts with the Saigon offices. Refugees were pouring out of the north into unprepared centers in the south. General Nguyen-van-Hinh, the colorful, pro-French commander of the 200 thousand Vietnamese Army, was planning a revolt. Ngo-dinh-Diem, supported by the United States, won over the general only by convincing him that all American aid would be cut off if he staged a coup d'état. The premier and his friends were victorious in this crisis and felt more secure as American material aid was continued and American military advisers stood by his side.

LIGHTS AND SHADOWS

The young government of South Vietnam has not been idle. In the international field there has been the transfer of civilian authority from France; new accords for the liquidation of the four-power authority and setting up of more intimate relations with France, Cambodia and Laos; guarantees obtained by Vietnam at the SEATO Conference; installation of a Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo for strengthening of the ties with Japan; diplomatic recognition of Vietnam by Pakistan and the Philippines, and admission of Vietnam to E.C.A.F.E. (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) and I.C.A.O. (International Civil Aviation Organization).

In the national field there has been the formation of a National Assembly; reorganization of the provincial structure of the government; clean-up campaign against bribery and organized vice; establishment

and development of the Ministries of Social Action, Information and Public Health; inclusion of the former royal territories into the national territory, and closer integration of the tribal clans into the national life.

In the field of defense there has been a transfer of military authority from France; incorporation of the religious sects' military forces into the National Army; reoccupation of territories recently liberated, and improvement of the Armed Forces' Inspection General.

In the social field there has been resettlement of about 800 thousand North Vietnamese refugees; a revision of labor laws with a view to raise the standard of living of the workers; new regulations for plantations; and a fixing of minimum salaries. In the agricultural field there have been a readjustment of relations between land-tenants and owners, compulsory recultivation of abandoned lands, and encouragement of cooperatives.

In the economic field there has been the establishment of the Vietnamese National Bank, the National Office of Exchange, a National Investment Fund and Institute for Economic Reconstruction; the lifting of restrictions on the transportation of goods between the various regions; creation of the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce; and exploitation of new lands.

In the field of education there has been the establishment of an Arts School in Saigon; construction of a special High School Center in Phu Tho; development of technical and popular education; and the opening of an Agricultural Training Center in Tan An.

POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

The two most significant achievements publicized abroad were in the field of politics. In the first accomplishment, the Chief of State, Bao Dai, was ousted by way of a referendum. The new Republic of South Vietnam was born on October 26, 1955, after a total of 5,335,688 voters gave Ngo-dinh-Diem 98.4 per cent of the total number of votes cast. Three days later, Ngo-dinh-Diem took the title of President and retained the post of Premier in the South Vietnamese Cabinet as well as the title and port-

folio of the Minister of Defense.

In a speech from the palace steps, flanked by army officers of the National Army, Cabinet members, two Roman Catholic bishops and two Buddhist leaders, the Premier-President told the hundred thousand listeners that unity had made possible an end to the "out-dated regime."

"Democracy is not a group of texts and laws to be read and applied. It is essentially a state of mind, a way of living with the utmost respect toward every human being, ourselves as well as our neighbors."

The President-Premier also declared that his regime aimed to achieve better international understanding, especially in South-east Asia, and work for "peace and social justice" and "liberty for all Vietnam, north and south."

In the second accomplishment Ngo-dinh-Diem won in the first election for the National Assembly (March 5, 1956). There were 123 seats and 400 candidates running for office. All members selected were close associates of the leader, including four Cabinet Ministers, a brother and a sister-in-law. Two major parties fought the elections. One, the Communists, from Radio Hanoi, urged the people not to vote because the move was illegal according to the Geneva agreement of July, 1954. The other, the Opposition, insisted the National Assembly was a pawn of the Premier-President.

These important reforms, however, have not consigned to the background valid criticisms of the infant regime. Some observers see it without definite purpose, paid for and organized by the United States and existing only as a barrier to the carrying out of the Geneva accord. Support comes from about one-eighth of the population in the south, mostly in and about Saigon.

The impressive showing of the referendum which cast Bao Dai from office was a pre-arranged affair. Key posts are held by the Premier-President's family, such as his brothers, Ngo-dinh-Can, head of the secret police in Central Vietnam, and Ngo-dinh-Luyen, Roving Ambassador in Europe.

Ngo-dinh-Diem has only American advisers. Graham Greene, the British novelist, who served as a correspondent in Vietnam during the war with the Communists, de-

scribes Ngo-dinh-Diem as isolated from his people by "cardinals and police cars with wailing sirens and foreign advisers droning of global strategy" when he should be out among the farmers unprotected and loved. Greene, filled with anti-American feelings, in 1956 published his satiric novel about Vietnam, *The Quiet American*, showing the United States as filled with materialists, incapable of understanding cultures other than their own.

The British reporter, Fowler, hates Americans. "I was tired of the whole pack of them, with their private stores of Coca-Cola and their portable hospitals and their wide cars and their not quite latest guns." Offsetting Fowler is Pyle, the United States official, young, crew-cut, with a "wide campus gaze." Greene sees victory for the Communists if Americans persist in being the chief foes of the government of North Vietnam.

Other weaknesses are pointed out by widely-read columnists, including the Alsop brothers and C. L. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*. The Viet Minh cadres are well organized in the south. The Hoa Hao politico-religious sect, with a million supporters and an army of ten thousand, obtains arms and advice from the Viet Minh. The National Army is not reliable with its low morale and resentment of too much American training and adoption of the American uniform.

Opposition is spreading. One powerful group, led by Tran-van-Huu, a former premier, formed the "Democratic Movement" in Paris and is supported by many prominent non-Communists of Vietnam who believe that peace can be achieved only by cooperating with the Viet Minh in building a united Vietnamese government. These are convinced that Ho Chi-minh is as eager as Ngo-dinh-Diem to achieve unification and has more power to attain this objective. The South Vietnamese regime is compared to the shadow state led by Chiang Kai-shek, shriveling on the American political vine.

HO CHI-MINH

Ho Chi-minh, mysterious Communist leader, is a man of many names. To some he has been known as Nguyen-van-Thanh

or Nguyễn-ai-Quoc. To others he is Nguyễn-thanh-Thanh or Ly Thuy. His father was a high-ranking official who lost his post because of anti-French views; Ho grew up filled with hatred for the Western masters. He dreamed of freeing his countrymen of foreign control, signed up on a French merchant vessel when 19 years of age, traveled about the world, and settled in Paris as a photographer during the First World War.

At this time he discovered Karl Marx and joined the Communist Party in 1920. He was a delegate in 1923 of the French Communist Party to the International Labor Congress in Moscow. He remained in the Soviet capital as Colonial Representative of its Permanent Committee.

In Canton in 1925 he was an attaché to Chiang Kai-shek's Soviet adviser, Michael Borodin. At this time he organized the Communist Party of Siam (Thailand). In Moscow, in 1927, he attended sessions with those planning world strategy along Communist lines and was detailed to form the Indo-Chinese Communist Party and direct the revolutionary movements in Malaya and Thailand.

During the Second World War, Ho cooperated with France and when Paris fell, and Japan moved into Indo-China, he fled to Yunnan province, China. At this time he became known as Ho Chi-minh, or "He Who Shines" or "The Enlightened One." Ho collected about him the Indo-Chinese war refugees and created the Vietnam Independence League (*Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi*), or the Viet Minh.

Among his colleagues was General Vo-nguyen-Giap, brilliant commander-in-chief of the Viet Minh Army. The general had spent many years in French jails and his anti-French feelings burned into white heat after his wife died in prison. Ho was smuggled into North Tonkin in 1944 and after the surrender of the Japanese formed a Provisional Government for Vietnam (September 2, 1945). He proclaimed Vietnamese independence, with long quotations from the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. Six months later, Ho was elected first President of the Republic of Vietnam. In this manner, the wanderer-revolutionist be-

came the hero of the Indo-Chinese, and the one above all others, respected and feared by the French and trusted by the Russians as he followed, without deviation, the policies proclaimed by the Kremlin.

THE WORLD OF THE VIET MINH

"Democratic organization," that is, rigid political control, is being applied in North Vietnam, especially in the capital, Hanoi, and the nearby villages. The basis of this vast control system is a structure built around groups of 12. Every member of the group is responsible for the activities of the other 11. Everyone must be familiar with each name, what each does, what each thinks.

Cadres of both sexes are engaged in propaganda activities two or three times weekly and organize meetings for the residents in a street or neighborhood. The people are herded together in a room and then a period of indoctrination begins. The program does not vary, consisting of political lectures, carefully-worded questions put to the crowd, patriotic songs and dances followed by replies to the questions. The "little" folk, workers and the obscure, are impressed, but the intellectuals and the independent business men are being liquidated.

The youth from the ages of 11 to 16 are forced to join the militant youth organization, the Pioneers. They parade every Sunday, wearing the prescribed blue uniform with red scarf. At 18, a youth, if judged to be suitable material, may enter the Communist Party.

Young eyes see two worlds—the Communist "peace" world and the world of the "imperialist aggressors," who, so the press insists daily, "want to start the war again in order to enslave the nations." They are indoctrinated also by the movies where only Russian and Chinese films are shown. They see the glorious achievements of Communist countries compared with the sad failures of democratic lands. Deliberate hate is fostered by these films, many of which depict the Westerner as a degenerate. The mass response to this is indignation, defiance and more hatred for the anti-Communist peoples.

A treaty of aid and friendship was signed between China and North Vietnam in July, 1955. There was a "gift" of 800 million yuan (about \$38 million) from China and 400 million rubles from Moscow (\$100 million) given in the form of railroads, harbor improvement, airfields, textile plants, agricultural equipment and technicians.

As a counterbalance, France signed a one-year trade agreement with Hanoi in October, 1955, calling for exchanges of a billion francs (\$2,857 million) of goods on each side. France will deliver machines, spare parts, textiles, cars, bicycles, food and drug products, chemicals, building materials, books and magazines. France will receive, in return, anthracite, raw silk, agricultural products, embroideries and lacquered articles.

Direct American assistance for South Vietnam began in August, 1950. A pact of Economic Cooperation was signed on September 7, 1951. Similar agreements were signed with Cambodia and Laos. Under the STEM (Special Technical and Economic Mission) program of the Foreign Operations Administration \$96 million was authorized as technical and economic aid in the fiscal years 1951-1954. It has been used to finance projects in village rehabilitation, sanitation, small business enterprises, irrigation and public works. An additional \$30 million annually in "military-support assistance" was allocated in 1953 and 1954. The technical and economic aid to the three countries for the fiscal year 1955-1956 was reported as reaching \$100 million.

There was also the military aid agreement of December, 1950. Under the agreement there have been shipments of small arms ammunition, transport vehicles, combat vehicles, military aircraft, naval small craft, communications equipment, small arms and automatic weapons, artillery ammunition, hospital supplies, and engineering and other technical equipment.

The STEM program for the fiscal year 1954 was \$25 million for economic and technical assistance. There were 25 Americans and about 100 native employees for the program. This mission operated mainly in an advisory capacity and aimed to aid the three local governments in many fields.



VIETNAM

Projects were under way, by the beginning of 1955, in agriculture and natural resources; public health and sanitation; education; transportation, communications and power; industry and mining; public administration, and war relief and housing. STEM also financed the import of some raw materials and supplies needed by business houses and local governments.

From the beginning, the STEM program operated in an unfavorable light. Skilled technical personnel was hard to recruit. There was friction between French officials and STEM. There were charges of the mission having an incompetent administration, badly executed projects, the importation of unnecessary equipment, the payment of excessive prices for land and local services and the enrichment of a few local speculators.

Private funds for South Vietnam also have been large. The most lavish American private donor was the National Catholic Welfare Conference which contributed \$3 million. It has built four thousand houses and 67 churches and supports cooperatives and a refugee newspaper. The American Red Cross gave \$300 thousand. The International Rescue Committee, mainly serving refugee students and scholars, has established small libraries and given books and aids in teaching projects. The Church World Service provided eggs, seeds, hoes and a village for 200 refugees and their families. CARE relief packages have been sent to about 135 thousand refugees, with packages also of clothing, medicine and supplies of work animals and pigs.

The Mennonite Church concentrated upon aid for community development. The International Rescue Committee aided by the Junior Chambers of Commerce of Asia and Americas supported the "Operation Brotherhood" movement, initiated by the Junior Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. About 60 Filipino doctors and nurses serve in hospitals, supported by volunteer workers from Thailand, Burma and India. The American Women's Association, composed mainly of the wives of American officials in Saigon, equipped a dispensary

for orphans and furnished food and clothing for some of the most destitute.

There are serious differences between the policies of France and the United States. France bases her position on the policy of "co-existence" and a continuation of economic and cultural ties with North Vietnam. The United States regards North Vietnam as a formidable menace and South Vietnam as a power to be reinforced in order to check the march of communism. Admiral William H. Standley, USN (Ret.), former Ambassador to Soviet Russia, in the preface to his revealing book, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (1955), comes forth with an answer:

Nations, like people, have a long memory where insult or injury is concerned, a short memory for courtesies offered, for help, aid and assistance rendered in time of need. There is little capacity for gratitude in mankind. In diplomatic negotiations, look first for self-interest—for your own country in the issues discussed, behind the facade of your opponent's smooth statements or vitriolic charges. You will then base your negotiations upon a foundation of reality. All else is fantasy.

These words fit well the frame of the Vietnamese picture. Intelligent self-interest demands that the United States protect those regions chilled by the winds blowing upon them from the totalitarian world.




"In the course of the twentieth century so-called totalitarian movements arose, some of which are still struggling for political power, which, however, they obtained for a part—and that in large parts of the world—or had once obtained. These movements are the cause of a peculiar, strangely analogous disorder which was hitherto unknown as such, even a disorganization of law. While retaining the superficial forms of law they hollow out its inner substance. By means of innumerable legal provisions they cause a more or less far-reaching, at times an almost absolute, lawlessness. . . . We are concerned, therefore, with a struggle for law, or to be more precise, the defence of law, and not with a political fight. This struggle must be decided in the field of law and by lawful means, objectively, without indulging in claptrap, but with that restrained inner passion which this purpose requires."

From an address by Dr. Herman Weinkauff delivered to the International Commission of Jurists at Baden-Baden on 29 April 1955.


FREE ASIA'S IMPORTANCE

WORLD MANPOWER

Free World = 1.8 Billion




Soviet Bloc = 0.9 Billion



1 = 100 Million People


U.S. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FROM ASIA

(Imports from Asia as Percent of Total U.S. Imports in 1954)




DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

(As Percent of FY1956 Budget)



PRINCIPAL U.S. EXPORTS TO FREE ASIA

1954 (\$ Millions)



—Department of State Bulletin

NEW BOOKS ON ASIA¹

By Genevieve C. Linebarger

Consultant, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania

IN a curious and fateful way, more firmly than seems warranted by the mere factor of geographical proximity, the destiny of Japan has been a critically decisive element in determining the fate of the rest of Asia. The subtle links which bind together the destinies of the Southeast and East Asian nations are not merely the obvious ones of economic necessity or physical nearness. Indeed, the physical placement of Asia on a map is extremely deceptive in terms of logistics or economics. From the viewpoint of economy of effort as well as of money it has frequently been argued that it is on occasion more profitable to ship goods from Europe or the United States to a stated part of Asia than to transport the same goods from one Asian country to another.

The tie of Japan to many of the Asian nations derives from something far more substantial than the remote cultural heritage of Buddhism which is common, for example, to Ceylon and Japan. Japan is important because the Japanese made modern Japan important in industrial and political terms. As to the other nations of Asia, they were culturally, politically and linguistically further apart from one another, in many instances, than are the most diverse nations of Europe.

Often, if one speaks seriously of Asia, it is difficult to know what is meant. Asia is a nebulous philosophical concept, a term of chameleon-like nature, useful only if defined for the purpose of the particular discussion at hand and with the strict under-

standing that the *ad hoc* definition may be discarded at the end of the discussion.

Yet there are Asian ties, even if they often seem to be of nothing more than a mystical nature. Recent world events provide some of the most definite ties. It is all too easy to play the fascinating game of "if . . ." in history. If there had been no Japan—or if Japan had won in 1942—or if Japan had been so weak as to stay on the Anglo-American side in World War II, what might not have happened in the Asian history of the last 20 years?

To put the matter baldly, it is possible to make the case that, except for Japanese militarism, there would exist few of the present-day "Asian" nations in their present form. The struggle with Japan brought physical, moral, economic and military weakness to the Chinese Nationalists, and thus helped bring about the rise of Communist China. In Southeast Asia, one can point at equally good reasons for arguing that most of the new—or, better, reconstituted—states of the area would in all probability not exist in their present form if the Japanese had not first removed colonial rule for a crucial period of years and secondly awakened a spirit of self-government by the offer—no matter how spurious it may have been—of some self-government to the peoples of the area. The failure of Asian militarism is itself a unifying force for much of East and Southeast Asia; millions of people have the common memories of having seen how a great military empire can fall.

F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton, and B. R. Pearn, in their jointly written *The Far East 1942-1946* treat the Far East of the war and immediate postwar periods. Actually, the dates in the title are a little misleading because the chronology of the book extends into 1947. Approximately the first third of the book, written by F. C. Jones, is a more

¹ F. C. Jones, Hugh Borton, and B. R. Pearn, *The Far East 1942-1946* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 589, \$14.00).

D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1955, pp. 807, \$10.00).

Tieh-tseng Li, *The Historical Status of Tibet* (New York: King's Crown Press, 1956, pp. 312, \$5.00).

Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan: Government and Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956, pp. 456, \$5.00).

Yuan-li Wu, *An Economic Survey of Communist China* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 566, \$12.50).

concise, brilliantly digested summary of his own earlier work, *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945* (London, 1954). This excellent review of the role played by Japan in Asia forms the background for the remainder of the book.

The rest of the book comprises the following: a short chapter by Jones on the efforts made to obtain peace in China at the end of World War II and the failure of those efforts; a chapter by Pearn, comprising somewhat under a fifth of the total length, which concerns the immediate postwar situation in the nations of southeast Asia; and three chapters by Borton which concern, respectively, the immediate postwar situations in Japan, in Korea, and in the former mandated territory of the Pacific.

The Far East 1942-1946 is a valuable addition to the field of Far Eastern affairs. It is perhaps the only attempt to provide the contiguous background for developments in the Far East since World War II; and, in general, the authors have performed an honest and thoughtful task.

A book which supplements *The Far East 1942-1946* by giving the earlier background—much of it before the emergence of Japan as a world power—of a large part of South-east Asia is D. G. E. Hall's *A History of South-East Asia*. The title of Hall's book is largely self-explanatory except for one major omission from the history: the Philippines. Mr. Hall states that he has excluded the Philippines and Assam on the ground that both stand aside from the main stream of historical developments of the area. In view of the fact that Borneo is included as are islands from the Andamans and Nicobars on the one side to New Guinea on the other one can hardly feel that this is a valid argument. One might, as logically, have omitted Thailand because it was the only nation of the area not conquered by the Europeans. However, in view of the monumental amount of material covered in *A History of South-East Asia*, one cannot begrudge its author the right to confine his area however much one may deplore the limitation.

In general the areas which have had British government (i.e. Singapore and Malaya, the British areas of Borneo and

Burma) are the most thoroughly covered by Mr. Hall. Minor inaccuracies in the descriptions of the early Thai and Vietnamese governments do not detract from the excellence of the work as a whole. The book divides rather neatly into quarters, and the divisions illustrate the historical character of the work. Approximately one fourth of the total length of the book is devoted to the early history of the Southeast Asian area before the coming of the Europeans. Two sections, together comprising about one half of the book, cover the European expansion with one section for, respectively, the early and later phases. The last quarter of the work concerns the resurgence of nationalism in Southeast Asia from 1900 onwards.

Naturally this arrangement compresses rather sharply the recent developments in Southeast Asia, but since the book does not purport to be a study of the recent past, the proportioning of space cannot in any sense be considered a demerit. The appendices, lists of dynasties, governors and governors-general are valuable and contain a large amount of highly compressed information.

Rounding out the historical perspective in Asia is Tieh-tseng Li's *The Historical Status of Tibet*. Dr. Li's work is a thorough and scholarly book which covers in general terms the history of Tibet and in particular the foreign relations and international legal status of the area.

Of especial importance is the treatment of the question of Chinese suzerainty in relation to Tibet. The 1903-1904 Young-husband negotiations in which Britain attempted to set up Tibet as a buffer state with a British representative while at the same time acknowledging Chinese suzerainty are of particular importance in the light of later events. Through the detailed discussion of the Simla Conference of 1913 and the description of the relations of the British, Russians, Indians and Chinese to Tibet it is Dr. Li's explicit thesis that, despite the wide interest of the European nations in Tibet, the acceptance by the latter of a status under Chinese suzerainty constituted a legitimate reason for the Chinese Communists to take over Tibet at a later time.

British interest in Tibet, largely stimu-

lated by fear for India, appears to have been largely and repetitively rejected by the Tibetans as they repeatedly turned to China for leadership. The British interest in Tibet was naturally assumed for a period by the Indian government on its accession to power.

In discussing the postwar situation Dr. Li makes it appear evident that any present rapprochement between Tibet and Communist China is not something new but an attitude predicated on long-standing historical precedent. More particularly he makes clear the facts (1) that the removal of British power from India gave the Chinese Communists the opportunity to step in to settle the Tibetan issue, and (2) that the rumored Western desire of air bases in the area gave the Communists the additional excuse to carry out a military campaign in Tibet while the West was engaged in Korea.

The United Nation debates in which Tibet appealed for aid in resisting incorporation into the territory of China demonstrated the fact that no one appeared very clear as to the exact status of Tibet. The U.S.S.R., Nationalist China (somewhat surprisingly) and Communist China maintained that Tibet is and has been an historical and integral part of China, while the delegates of other nations refrained from committing themselves on the status of Tibet. Not until 1951 was the legal status of Tibet—under some duress—defined. At this time Tibet agreed to unite and drive out imperialist forces in Tibet, after which Tibet was to return to its "Motherland," the (Communist) People's Republic of China. Tibet thus became a military district of China. Dr. Li feels that this solution, unfortunate as it may be for the Tibetans, was a step toward stabilization of the area.

Continuing into the realm of present day affairs two books help to complete the picture of the Far East. One is: Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan: Government and Politics*. The other is: Yuan-li Wu, *An Economic Survey of Communist China*.

The Quigley and Turner book after a relatively brief survey of the prewar and wartime government of Japan proceeds to the occupation period, the drafting of the

new constitution, and a description of the government functioning under that new constitution. In the latter category the authors discuss the parts of the government (e.g. the Emperor, the executive, the National Diet, the courts and local government) and the principal political parties including their organization and composition. Of interest are the appendices which include the juxtaposed old and new constitutions of Japan, among other documents.

The authors appear to feel that, regardless of the results obtained, General Douglas MacArthur should not have been allowed the freedom of policy decision which was his. They express the opinion that the diplomatic representative carried General MacArthur's views rather than those of the State Department—a situation which they deplore as neither desirable nor in accord with the responsibilities of our foreign office. The authors are certainly entitled to their opinion on this subject. The fact that the Japanese appear to have found it easier to accept a pseudo-emperor in the person of General MacArthur than they might have accepted a more conventional occupation government would seem, however, to leave the question open to debate. Perhaps a compromise solution might have been reached whereby the forms of diplomacy could have been maintained while General MacArthur retained his imperial facade; perhaps not.

Though Messrs. Quigley and Turner tend to deplore what they feel to be a return to Japanese conservatism they have attempted to arrive at impartiality. In the actual description of the new Japanese government they have succeeded in excluding partisanship to a greater degree than in the sections dealing with the occupation. Especially valuable are the descriptions of the major political parties.

Dr. Wu's *An Economic Survey of Communist China* is of necessity a quite different kind of book. In large part the figures used by Dr. Wu are necessarily from Communist sources and since, for that reason, they are impossible to check, it becomes necessary to approach the subject of Communist economics with some caution.

This caution Dr. Wu evinces. He has

attempted to arrive at honest and serious conclusions without, at the same time, being led astray by his sources. The book discusses briefly the issues between capitalism and communism and the split between the Chinese Nationalists over the interpretation of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teachings on economics. The author then proceeds to demonstrate in economic terms the manner in which destruction of the Manchurian industrial complex by the Soviets became one of the major causes of the Nationalist collapse. Of especial interest to the student of the Far East is the explanation economically of the Nationalist inflation both during and after the war with Japan.

This is not in any sense a sensational book. It is a very careful book. It covers Communist economic planning, the industrialization, and socialization of China under the Communists, land distribution, transportation, trade, labor, finance and economic international relations. The entire Communist system is approached not from a moral or partisan viewpoint but entirely from one of Communist economics.

Perhaps the most serious criticism of the

book would be that while it is somewhat technical for the person not interested in the Far East, it is somewhat too much of a straight economics book for many Far Eastern specialists. This criticism, however, is a positive virtue if one considers the wealth of facts contained and the amount of impartial honest labor which went into the compiling of the book. This is not a book for a light and easy review of the recent Far Eastern events.

It would surely appear from the five books here reviewed that the thesis advanced of Japanese influence in the recent Far Eastern past is justified. The nations of Southeast Asia were set on their paths of independence through the war with Japan; Nationalist China fell, and with the fall of Nationalist China part of Korea and all of Tibet were absorbed into Communist China, all largely because of the economic situation created by the war with Japan; Communist China launched its new economic system and began sending out subtle waves of new foreign relationships; and finally the government of Japan itself was reconstituted because of the Japanese defeat in that same war.

Eustace Seligman

What the United States can do about **INDIA**



"almost everything a literate citizen needs to know about India . . . the Indian point of view is presented fairly and precisely . . . written with admirable insight . . . deserves the widest possible audience."

—JOHN GUNTHER

"have been recommending it to everyone who mentions India in my presence . . . fair, honest and lucid . . . manages to pack into short space an amazing number of profound comments about India and Indo-American relations."

—SANTHA RAMA RAU

The conquest of China by the Communists was a great blow to us and the rest of the free world—but there is still an opportunity for us to prevent another such defeat in India, if American public opinion is alerted to the present state of the Indian mind. Mr. Seligman's book is based on first hand observation of the current situation in India and it demonstrates with sympathetic comprehension the great differences in American and Indian thinking on politics, foreign policy and attitudes toward Communism.

\$2.95

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS



Washington Square, New York 3, N. Y.

RECEIVED AT OUR DESK

THERE is no denying the impact of first-hand accounts; the men "who were there" offer readers their direct personal impressions, often biased, often out of perspective, but nonetheless vivid. Several current works on the Far East fall into this category:

HUNZA: LOST KINGDOM OF THE HIMALAYAS. By JOHN CLARK. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1956. 270 pages, \$5.00).

In Hunza, 25,000 people live in a feudal civilization, isolated from their Russian Communist neighbors (the border is only 14 miles away) by impassable terrain. John Clark, geologist from Princeton University, chose Hunza as the scene of his attempt to show what one man could do to teach a backward community how to help itself.

His efforts there convinced him that Americans must share with the rest of the world the five fundamentals of Western thinking: "objectivity, dissatisfaction, creative confidence, individuality, and responsibility." "What Asia needs today is not millions of dollars but rather thousands of the best of our Western teachers," he concludes, making a strong plea for us to "stop at once the ruinous system of large, direct gifts from the American government to Asian governments." Whether or not the reader agrees, his day-by-day account of living with the Hunzas is rich in source material for the study of a primitive culture.

DELIVER US FROM EVIL. By THOMAS A. DOOLEY. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956. 214 pages, \$3.50).

Dr. Thomas A. Dooley was stationed in Haiphong, in North Vietnam, when 600,000 Vietnamese were moved from the Communist North to the non-Communist South, after the peace treaty at Geneva ended the war in Indo-China. He housed and cared for the refugees before the United States Navy moved them to the

free areas of Saigon. His moving account of the tortured, the starving and homeless is colored by his feeling that "there is a special power in love," and by his religious philosophy. Photographs add to the vivid accounts of life in the camps, opposition to the Communists and the effects of Communist propaganda.

THE MEANING OF BANDUNG. By CARLOS P. ROMULO. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956. 59 pages and appendix, \$2.50).

Here the chief delegate to Bandung from the Philippine Republic interprets the lessons of Bandung for an American audience. As he sees it, the meaning of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung is this: "... outside those lands where the Communists are now in control, there is an ever-growing devotion to the principles of democracy and freedom . . . , We are achieving, in the free world, West and East, a common platform." His chapter on "Asian Criticisms of America" lists the major charges levelled against the United States at Bandung and wherever Asians and Africans gather. The appendix to this small volume includes the text of the final communique of the Bandung Conference, as released by the Indonesian Embassy.

THE COLOR CURTAIN. A Report on the Bandung Conference. By RICHARD WRIGHT. (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956. 221 pages, \$3.75).

For Richard Wright, the meaning of the Bandung Conference was far more urgent. "In sum, Bandung was the last call of Westernized Asians to the moral conscience of the West." A Negro American novelist, Wright is sensitive to the racial implications of the meeting of the colored peoples; he feels that it will not be easy to achieve a "common platform" (Romulo's expression) for the democrats of East and West. Speaking of the first

section of the communique, he points out that it "sounds innocent enough," but "When the day comes that Asian and African raw materials are processed in Asia and Africa by labor whose needs are not as inflated as those of Western laborers, the supremacy of the Western world, economic, cultural, and political, will have been broken once and for all on this earth . . ." Richard Wright's *Report* may be less than objective, but he is a realist. If the average white Westerner accepts the change in the world's economic structure, "he will also have to accept, for an unspecified length of time, a much, much lower standard of living . . ." This, among other more philosophical problems, is the ultimate meaning of Bandung.

MANJIRO, The Man Who Discovered America. BY HISAKAZU KANEKO. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956. 149 pages, \$2.75).

A biographical tale about a young Japanese fisherman who was shipwrecked, and rescued by the Yankee whaler *John Howland*, and taken to America by the skipper. "John Mung," as he was called in Fairhaven, Massachusetts, was the first Japanese to live and go to school in the United States. His subsequent reports to Japanese officials of the strange life in America helped to pave the way for Commodore Perry's visit to that isolated and feudal land in 1853. This sidelight of history is told by a Japanese author who preserves the flavor of the boy's experience.

Interesting as these first-hand reports are, they do not offer the bulk of factual data found in the impartial texts. Several of the new books on Asia are in this group:

FAR EASTERN POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD. BY HAROLD M. VINACKE. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1956. 476 pages, illustrations and index, \$5.00).

This survey details post-war developments in Japan, China, Korea, Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines and analyzes the problems of the Korean War, Formosa and organizing security in Southeast Asia. Bibliographical references are included.

LAND OF THE 500 MILLION. BY GEORGE B. CRESSEY. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1956. 356 pages and index, \$10.00).

Author of "*China's Geographic Foundations*," George Cressey has traveled 100 thousand miles in China, Mongolia and Tibet. In this detailed and scholarly text, he focuses on the Chinese people: "China's 500 million people form the most important fact in its geography. There may, indeed be more than that today, and there will be tomorrow." Maps, photographs, tables, and climatic charts add to the information, which includes chapters on: the people, the land, the climate, the crops and other resources, commerce and industry. Various regions receive chapters of their own. "China's Prospects" are considered in the final chapter. Bibliographical listings are detailed.

CHINA'S CHANGING MAP. BY THEODORE SHABAD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 270 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$7.50).

Communist sources have been used "almost entirely" for the detailed information in this up-to-date political and economic geography, by a member of *The New York Times'* foreign news desk. All autonomous minority areas are studied; special attention is given to developments since 1949. In Part I, the author deals with the physical setting, the political framework and the economic pattern of Communist China; in part II he deals with the various regions in detail. Maps and tables are included. The difficulty of working with Communist sources is obvious; one result is that industrial production figures cited here are sometimes at odds with the figures cited by George B. Cressey, for example. In the field of economic and political geography this book adds to the available material on the Chinese People's Republic.

* * *

STRUGGLE FOR ASIA. BY SIR FRANCIS LOW. Frederick A. Praeger, 1956. 233 pages and index, \$3.50.

A country by country survey of recent developments in Asia, for the layman.

THE GANDHI READER. By HOMER A. JACK, ed. Indiana University Press, 1956. 498 pages, Notes, Chronology, Bibliography and Index, \$7.50.

Significant writings by and about Gandhi, with explanatory commentary by the editor.

AT THE FEET OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By RAJENDRA PRASAD. Philosophical Library, 1956. 350 pages and Index, \$6.00.

The President of the Indian Republic gives his account of the Gandhian era.

CRESCENT AND GREEN. Philosophical Library, 1956. 170 pages, \$4.75.

A miscellany of contemporary writings on Pakistan.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND PAKISTAN. By MUSHTAQ AHMAD. The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1955. 156 pages, Bibliography and Index, \$2.00.

A critical survey of the United Nations and Pakistan's experience with that body.

KOREA TOMORROW. By KYUNG CHO CHUNG. Macmillan, 1956. Appendices, Bibliography, Notes and Index, \$5.95.

A comprehensive study of Korea, past and present, by a Korean scholar.

POLITICS AND HISTORY

BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION. By NICHOLAS P. VAKAR (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 225 pages, table of transliteration, notes, index of names, general index, \$6.50).

After discussing the land and the people of this little known country, the author notes that "The truth is that the regions in question have always been Polish to the Poles, Lithuanian to the Lithuanians and Belorussian to the Belorussians" Transfers and migrations have made it more difficult to determine the origins of the Belorussians, now members of an autonomous state of the U.S.S.R. and, independently, part of the United Nations. This detailed and painstaking work discusses the traditions, the origins and the history of the still primitive Belorussians under

Russia, Poland, Germany (Nazi) and again under the Soviets. The account of sovietization reveals the active imperialism of the U.S.S.R.: "Under the Belorussian flag . . . Belorussian identity was being erased." A scholarly study by a professor of Russian at Wheaton College.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC POLICY.

By ADMIRAL ELIS BIÖRKLUND. Translated by the author with Albert Read. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956. 130 pages, appendices, large folding map, \$3.50).

This "historical-political investigation into the problem of atomic weapons during the period 1954-1955" was made by a Swedish naval officer after 30 years of study of Russian affairs. After a summary of the years 1945-1950, Admiral Biörklund discusses the views of the Western powers and the Eastern powers toward international controls. He then turns to a study of the practical implications of maximum U. N. control which would require a scattered staff of at least 800,000, plus a central organ in the U.N. The problem of costs as well as lack of agreement among the great powers make such a program impractical. As the author sees it, ". . . logic and consideration of what is politically possible make it necessary to restrict control to what really can be controlled, and to carry out this control in a way that does not infringe so seriously in the autonomy of a state that political uneasiness is increased." He suggests limiting control to the prohibition of the larger H and A bombs and chemical and biological warfare.

THE GERMAN FIFTH COLUMN IN WORLD WAR II. By LOUIS DE JONG. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956. 297 pages, glossary, acknowledgments and index, \$5.00).

The Executive Director of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation has made a detailed and careful study of the work of Hitler's notorious Fifth Column and the unreasoning fear of the Fifth Column—the German Trojan Horse—that spread through the Allied World. Part I outlines the ideas people

had about Hitler's secret Fifth Column of saboteurs; Part II details the facts as far as they can be determined. The analysis in Part III is the most interesting part of the book, as the author discusses "how the idea of an omnipresent, universally active Fifth Column can spring up in people's minds. . . ." He concludes that "the evidences of a German military Fifth Column of any considerable magnitude were confined to Poland and Yugoslavia;" the political Fifth Column was considerably less dangerous.

BRIEF AUTHORITY. By EDWIN F. STANTON. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. 285 pages and index, \$4.00).

The first United States Ambassador to Thailand writes of his career of 32 years of service in the Far East with perception and understanding. Experiences with the bandits and war lords of his early days in China started a diplomatic career that involved him in many crises, including the Japanese-Chinese Manchurian War, the Chinese civil war prior to World War II and a period of internment during that struggle.

EARLY TRAVELERS IN THE CANADAS, 1791-1867. Edited by GERALD CRAIG. (New York and Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1956. 286 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.00).

Professor Craig has collected the writings of 30 visitors, mostly British, to Canada in the early Nineteenth Century. The book could serve as a travel guide to Canada of that era. The social and economic life are described with the geography by travelers, hunters, military men, farmers, journalists and even ladies.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE, ITS STRUCTURE AND SPIRIT, 1497-1953. By ERIC A. WALKER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 337 pages, index, and folding map, \$5.00).

To compress 350 years of Empire history into one compact volume is not an easy task. As Professor Walker points out,

this is not a "systematic politico-economic and still less a constitutional history." "Four-fifths of the book deals with the period since 1833, fully two-fifths with that since 1914 . . . because the spirit and structure that we know have been shaped most directly for us by the events of these more recent years." He discusses the British Commonwealth, its colonies, protectorates and mandated territories in considerable detail before going on to an analysis of foreign policy, the empire at war, and "The Two Worlds." Eric A. Walker was Professor in the University of Cape Town for 25 years and Professor of Imperial and Naval History in the University of Cambridge for 17 years.

TRADE UNION GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN. By B. C. ROBERTS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. 470 pages, appendices and index, \$6.00).

Lecturer in Trade Union Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Mr. Roberts outlines the organization of British trade unions in great detail, including their conditions for membership, their organizational structure, their financing and their facilities for research and worker education.

THE NEGRO POTENTIAL. By ELI GINSBERG and others. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. 138 pages and notes, \$3.00).

The Director of the Conservation of Human Resources Project at Columbia University and those who worked with him are manpower specialists, and they study the problem of *THE NEGRO POTENTIAL* as a problem of utilization of manpower. In an extremely concise and informative little volume, they discuss the progress of the Negro in America, expanding educational opportunities, the negro soldier, the need for better preparation for skilled and professional work and the lessons for manpower policy we can learn from the study.



BY **GEORGE McT. KAHIN**
Associate Professor
of Government at
Cornell University

95 PAGES

\$2.00

The Asian-African Conference

Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955

From this thoughtful account of the Bandung Conference the reader can catch, in the words of the *Christian Science Monitor* reviewer, "the sense of statesmanlike responsibility which independence is bringing to the new-old nations of Asia and Africa."

Professor Kahin brings out the fear of Communist infiltration felt by the leaders of many Asian states and points out that Chou En-lai's reasonableness at the Conference may have been dictated by a desire to assuage these fears. The background, achievements, and key speeches given at Bandung are ably presented in this book by an informed political scientist who attended the Conference and who is personally acquainted with many Asian leaders.

Other Significant Cornell titles about the East

Nationalism & Revolution in Indonesia

By *George McT. Kahin, Cornell University*

"One can hardly imagine a more thoroughly documented account. . . . Southeast Asia specialists are unlikely to have anything surpassing this book in detail until the Indonesian leaders themselves take to writing memoirs."—*Saturday Review*. 503 pp., 4 maps. \$6.00.

The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia

By *John F. Cady, Ohio University*

"This illuminating and well-organized study of French expansion in China and Indochina . . . provides a rounded picture of the French motives, their false starts and failures, and eventual qualified success in keeping up with Britain. . . ."—*John K. Fairbank, American Hist. Review*. 334 pp., maps, \$5.00

Agricultural Resources of China

By *T. H. Shen, former Director of the National Agricultural Research Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Nanking, China*

"No Chinese is better qualified to evaluate the country's land and crops."—*Far Eastern Survey*. "The book as a whole is a model of its kind . . . statistical tables make the most of the restricted sources available."—*Pacific Affairs*. 425 pp., illus. \$5.00.

The Travels of Lao Ts'an

By *Liu T'ieh-yun. Translated by Harold Shadick, Cornell University*

This translation of a modern Chinese novel is a compassionate and human portrayal. One of the few Chinese novels available in English. it was called, by the *New York Times*, "a skillful and judicious translation, supported by scholarly notes and a sensible introduction." 300 pp., 12 illus., \$4.50.

Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y.

WORLD DOCUMENTS

Statement by Baghdad Pact Council

On April 19, the Council of the Baghdad Pact issued the following communique, which includes mention of the fact that the United States is now a full member of the Economic Committee and Counter-Subversion Committee:

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second meeting of ministers in Teheran from 16th to 19th April, 1956, under the chairmanship of Hussein Ala, Premier of Iran.

The meeting was attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, and by the Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom. Loy W. Henderson, United States Deputy Under Secretary of State, headed a group of American Government observers at the conference.

The Council emphasized that their several governments adhered firmly to the principles that inspired the United Nations Charter and the Baghdad Pact was fully in conformity with those principles. Its object was to assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security and promoting human welfare.

The pact was wholly defensive in character. While its members were determined to defend themselves against aggression, they desired at the same time to live in peace with all governments and all peoples.

The Council had before it the task of considering the reports and recommendations of various committees of the Baghdad Pact organization and of reviewing the international political situation especially from the point of view of its repercussions on the pact area.

In light of their thorough review of the political situation the Council considered that although there was a change of tactics the basic objectives of international communism remained unchanged. Its activities in the area required that the free world continue to exercise unceasing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained and freedom and peace were to be preserved. There could be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen the defensive capacity of this area.

In the view of the Council the criticism and attacks from neutralist and other sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other similar organizations created to provide for legitimate defense and peaceful development of their member nations spring largely from lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of its true purposes.

It is the hope of the Council that as these purposes become better known, these criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active cooperation and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as it is intended to be, a unifying factor among the peoples in the region who wish to preserve a free and democratic way of life. Meanwhile these criticisms and attacks can only help to keep the region divided and weak and member countries decided to counter them actively and resolutely.

Specific problems which were causing tension in this area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular the Council emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes.

In the midst of this troubled political situation it was the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered the best means of safeguarding peace and stability, and of promoting welfare and unity of the area, while at the same time it effectively served the cause of world peace.

Urgent steps must therefore be taken to strengthen this pact. For this purpose member countries in this area must be equipped with the means for developing their military and economic strength and the pact must yield positive visible results. At the same time, systematic efforts should be made to create a better understanding of the pact among the nations which are opposing it.

The Council adopted the report of the Economic Committee and various resolu-

tions submitted by it. These provide for the establishment of a center for imparting training in the use of agricultural machinery and in methods of soil and water conservation, for establishing joint training centers for anti-malaria operations and health education, for undertaking jointly by two or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests, for coordination of research in certain fields and for the exchange of technical personnel and of information on scientific and technical subjects.

The Council agreed that it was necessary to implement resolutions without delay, particularly those relating to projects which are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the well-being of people in the pact area. The Council noted with satisfaction that the atomic energy center was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 1957.

The Council drew special attention to the importance of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more member countries. It was decided that a technical committee comprising members of each of the interested governments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary study of the possibility of a joint development plan of water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates basin, and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any further detailed studies which may be required.

The possibilities of development of mineral resources in the eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in the Caspian provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were noted.

The Council also decided to set up a working party to meet in June, 1956, at Teheran to consider the means whereby regional projects of interest to two or more members of the pact could be studied and implemented through economic and technical assistance. The Council recognized the far-reaching need for regional cooperation and joint projects in the fields of industry and communications.

The Council noted that the Economic Committee would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of production and trade between member countries, with a view to promoting trade within the pact area.

The Council considered that notwith-

standing the fact that the needs of the member countries of the pact area were at present similar, there was scope for expansion of trade in this area in the immediate future.

In this connection, Pakistan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed.

The Council recognized the importance of technical assistance between member countries.

The Council agreed that a secretariat should coordinate this work on the basis of the offers already received by the Economic Committee.

It noted that the United Kingdom and Pakistan had offered technical assistance.

The Council welcomed active participation of the United States in the work of the pact organization.

The Council considered that active and continuing support of the United States for the pact and its objectives was an essential factor in the strengthening and development of member countries, and in the realization of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed its solid support of the pact and stated that it would continue to lend support to individual and collective efforts of members nations to attain the political, defensive, economic and social objectives of the pact.

The United States, on the invitation of the Council, became a full member of the Economic Committee and Counter-Subversion Committee.

The terms of reference of these two committees provided for an extension of membership to nonsignatory governments at the discretion of the Council.

The United States delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to member nations, and indicated that the United States would consider ways of assisting joint projects undertaken by members of the Economic Committee of the pact.

The United States observers to the Military Committee offered to establish a military liaison group at the permanent headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed by a flag or general officer. The Council welcomed and accepted this proposal.

The United States observers expressed their Government's intention of continuing its military assistance to the member countries.

The Council considered that there is a threat of subversion in this area, and agreed that it can be met most effectively by co-operation among the members of the pact.

To this end, the Council decided to establish a permanent organization under the administrative control of the secretary general.

The Council recognized that while the threat of subversion could be countered with measures designed to expose its real nature, and to give the widest publicity to the aims and activities of the pact, the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradication of the conditions in which it thrives—namely,

economic under-development and defensive weakness. Both must be remedied as soon as possible.

In the light of a common determination that the territorial integrity of the member states of the pact shall be defended, the Military Committee decided to expedite all necessary further measures for the defense of the Baghdad Pact countries.

The Council considered a report of the committee, and noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in the military sphere.

The Council decided that its next meeting at ministerial level should be held at Karachi, in the month of January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council will continue to meet regularly at the deputies level.

Dissolution of the Cominform

On April 17, a statement announcing the dissolution of the Cominform was made public. The full text of the statement as published in the Italian Communist Party newspaper *L'Unita* follows in translation:

The formation in 1947 of the Information Office of Communist and Worker's parties has had a positive part in bridging the gap among Communist parties that occurred with the dissolution of the Comintern.

It has contributed notably by its reinforcement of the international proletariat and by better linking the working class and all the workers in the struggle for a stable peace, for democracy and for socialism.

The Information Office and its newspaper, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, have had a positive function in developing and reinforcing the bonds and the reciprocal exchange of experience between the Communist parties and the workers, and in clarifying the problems of Marxist-Leninist doctrine while taking into account the actual conditions in individual countries and the experience of the Communist movement and the international working class.

This has helped in the strengthening of brother parties and in increasing the influence of Communist parties among the masses.

However, the modifications that have taken place in the international situation

in the last few years:

The emergence of socialism from the confines of a single country and its transformation into a world system;

The formation of a vast "peace zone" that includes European and Asian states, socialist and non-socialist friends of peace;

The development and strengthening of many Communist parties in the capitalist, dependent and colonial countries, their activity in the struggle against the peril of war, and their achievement, for peace, for the vital interests of the workers and for the national independence of their countries;

And, finally, the tasks of overcoming the splits in the working class movement and the reinforcement of working class unity to bring success in the struggle for peace and socialism;

All this has created new conditions for the activities of working class and Communist parties.

The Information Office of the Communist and Workers' Parties, both in its composition and in its activities, does not correspond any more to these new conditions.

The Central Committees of the Com-

munist and Workers' parties participating in the Information Office, after an exchange of opinions on the problems of its activities, have recognized that the office as constituted in 1947 has exhausted its uses.

They have therefore all agreed that the office should cease its activities and the Information Office organ, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, should cease publication.

The Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' parties already participating in the Information Office believe that the individual parties and groups of parties, battling for the interests of the working class, pursuing their activities according to the general objectives of the Marxist-Leninist parties and according to the particular national conditions of their own countries, will find new useful methods of establishing links with each other.

The Communist and Workers' parties will without doubt continue on their own judgment, taking into account common problems of the struggle for peace, democracy and

socialism, the defense of the interests of the working class and of all workers, and the mobilization of the popular masses against the danger of war.

At the same time they will examine the problems of collaboration with parties with tendencies toward socialism, and also with other organizations which aim to consolidate peace and democracy.

All this will make even stronger the spirit of reciprocal collaboration between the Communist and Workers' parties, on the basis of the principles of the international proletariat.

All this will strengthen the fraternal bonds between them in the interests of the cause of peace, of democracy and of socialism.

The statement was signed by the Central Committees of the Bulgarian Communist party, the Hungarian Workers' party, the Italian Communist party, the Polish United Workers' party, the Rumanian Workers' party, the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and the French Communist party.

French Tunisian Agreement on Tunisian Independence

On March 20, France and Tunisia signed an agreement providing for Tunisian independence. The complete text follows:

On June 3, 1955, following the negotiations which had taken place between their delegations, the French Government and the Tunisian Government agreed to recognize Tunisia's full exercise of internal sovereignty. They thus manifested their will to enable the Tunisian people to attain its full development and to assume by stages the control of their destiny.

The two Governments recognize that the harmonious and peaceful development of French-Tunisian relations corresponds to the requirements of the modern world. They note with satisfaction that this evolution permits accession to complete sovereignty without suffering for the people or shocks for the state.

They affirm their conviction that by basing their relations on mutual and complete respect for their respective sovereignties in the independence and equality of the two states, France and Tunisia strengthen the

solidarity which unites them for the greater good of both countries.

Following the investiture speech of the French Premier and the reply to His Highness the Bey, reaffirming their common will to promote their relations in the same spirit of peace and friendship, the two Governments opened negotiations in Paris on Feb. 27.

In consequence:

France solemnly recognizes the independence of Tunisia.

It follows from this:

A. That the treaty concluded between France and Tunisia on May 12, 1881, can no longer govern French-Tunisian relations.

B. That such of the provisions of the conventions of June 3, 1955, as may be in contradiction with the new status of Tunisia, an independent and sovereign state, will be modified or abrogated.

From this also follows:

C. The exercise by Tunisia of its responsibilities in the matter of foreign affairs, security and defense, as well as the setting up of a Tunisian national army.

In respect for each other's sovereignty, France and Tunisia agree to define or complete the ways and means of an interdependence freely brought about between the two countries, by organizing their cooperation in the fields in which their interests are common, particularly in the matter of de-

fense and foreign affairs.

The agreements between France and Tunisia will establish the ways and means of the help which France will give Tunisia in building up the Tunisian national army.

The negotiations will be resumed on April 16, 1956, with a view to concluding, as quickly as possible and in accordance with the principles laid down in the present protocol, the acts necessary for putting them into effect.

Tito-Mollet Communique

Reprinted below are excerpts from the joint statement issued by President Tito and Premier Mollet:

The President of the Popular Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and President of the Federal Executive Council, M. Josip Broz Tito, visited France from May 7 to 12, 1956, as guest of the President of the French Republic, M. René Coty.

During his stay, President Tito, in addition to talks with the President of the Republic, M. Coty, had several meetings, with the President of the French Council of Ministers Guy Mollet, in which took part, on the Yugoslav side, Koca Popovic, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, on the French side, M. Christian Pineau, Foreign Affairs Minister.

These talks made it possible to note that the old tradition of entente between the French people and the people of Yugoslavia, consecrated in a common struggle in two world wars, and by an equal attachment to national independence and peace, lives on.

They have provided the occasion for a detailed exchange of views as much on present problems of world politics as on the relations between France and Yugoslavia. The two heads of Government recognized the utility of such meetings, from which a wide identity of views resulted, and they decided to continue them in future.

* * *

They noted their agreement to seek a way of disarmament by stages and underlined the vital importance of nuclear disarmament. Results in this field would solidify the international detente and, among other

advantages, would widen by a reduction of military burdens the possibility of assistance to the underdeveloped regions.

* * *

International aid to the under-developed regions constitutes, in their view, a fundamental task to which the different states should apply their efforts in the framework of the United Nations with a view to help these regions to progress in the social field and thus make possible a wider international cooperation based on the interdependence of interests.

* * *

During frank exchanges of view on North African problems, M. Guy Mollet set out the special position of Algeria and the policy which the French Government is applying there. President Tito assured him that the Yugoslav Government would favor all efforts which aimed at a liberal solution of the Algerian problem.

* * *

The two Governments . . . have resolved, while respecting their reciprocal alliances and commitments resulting from the Charter of the United Nations, to tighten the bonds traditionally uniting the two countries, by giving new impetus and wider scope to their cooperation in the political economic and cultural fields.

They are especially agreed to study the ways and means of cooperation between Yugoslavia and France in the field of the use of atomic energy for peaceful ends.

Every month a page of CURRENT HISTORY is devoted to a current problem that calls for background information to supplement day-by-day reporting. This month we shall . . .

FOCUS ON SINGAPORE

In 1824 the Sultan of Johore, on the mainland, sold to the British East India Company the 225-square-mile island of Singapore, one-half mile off the furthestmost tip of the Malay Peninsula. Singapore today is one of Southeast Asia's most modern cities. As a trade center it handles three-fourths of Malaya's exports and imports; as a manufacturing center it has pineapple canneries and rubber and tin smelting factories; as a port, it plays an important role in the European-Far East route. It is Britain's last major naval base in Southeast Asia and a principal area in Western defense plans.

Singapore is a Crown Colony with one and a quarter million people, 76 per cent of whom are Chinese, 2 per cent British and European, the remainder, Malayan. Under the present Constitution the British Governor has the power of veto over the legislative assembly, some members of which are elected and others appointed by the British colonial authorities. The elected representatives are led by the Chief Minister, who also acts as adviser to the Governor.

The spur to the nationalistic emphasis on independence was given by the British promise to grant independence to the Federation of Malay some time next year. Chief Minister David Marshall opened talks with Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd concerning self-government for Singapore on April 24. Britain agreed to a plan for a fully elected legislative assembly and Council of Ministers. Both agreed that Britain should be responsible for the foreign affairs and defense of Singapore. Britain was given emergency powers to suspend the Singapore Constitution. British citizenship such as the completely self-governing countries in the Commonwealth receive was to have been given to Singapore residents.

Negotiations failed over the question of British control of internal security matters which affect foreign affairs and external defense. The issue was whether Britain should retain imperial powers over Singapore's internal security. A Defense and Security Council, of equal British and Singapore membership plus a chairman, was authorized to override government decisions on internal security. Whoever controlled the chairmanship would in effect control not only the Council but the government of Singapore in matters of internal security relating to foreign defense and affairs. Britain wants the chairmanship to go to the British High Commissioner, who would replace the Governor under Singapore's new political system.

Chief Minister David Marshall, pro-nationalist, would not accept British control. He suggested as a compromise that the chairman, who casts the deciding vote in internal-external security matters, be given to a representative from the United Nations or the Federation of Malaya. Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd refused to yield on the ground that Singapore is essential to Western security. The British also fear that the Chinese population is oriented towards Red China.

On May 20, negotiations halted. David Marshall tried to resume negotiations with the Colonial Office. Meanwhile, he lost the support of his delegation, which disapproved of his concessions to the British. This step made the Colonial Office hesitant to resume the talks. On June 7, Mr. Marshall carried out his threat to resign if the talks failed. He is succeeded by Lim ku Hock.

—J.B.

The Month In Review

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

May 4—The United Nations Subcommittee on disarmament ends 7 weeks of meetings in a vain effort to frame an acceptable program for world disarmament.

Inter-American Relations

May 1—Diplomatic relations are restored between Ecuador and Peru on a full ambassadorial basis for the first time since early 1953, when Peru recalled her ambassador.

May 14—The Cuban government declares that Frederico Lloverias, Ambassador of the Dominican Republic, is not welcome in Cuba.

Israeli-Arab Dispute

May 3—Dag Hammarskjold, in his report to the Security Council, states that his Middle East trip accomplished a cease-fire along the borders of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Israel.

Mr. Hammarskjold, it is reported, warns Israel against resuming the Jordan River Project as incompatible with the U.N. resolution of 1953 against such a project.

May 21—Israel reluctantly approves of meeting Egypt for truce talks at the El Auja site.

May 24—The Israeli Government agrees to discuss measures to improve truce supervision along the Gaza strip. Egypt and Israeli plan to cooperate in the establishment and implementation of U.N. observation posts along the Gaza strip.

May 31—Arabs offer objections to the British proposal in the U.N. that Mr. Hammarskjold continue his effort to reach a peace settlement.

Japanese-Soviet Relations

May 14—Japan's Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Ichiro Kono, says that the Soviet Union has agreed to sign a short-term fishing pact with Japan before a peace treaty is concluded and before ambassadors

have been exchanged, although originally the Soviet Union insisted on these steps as prerequisites to a fishing treaty.

May 15—Fishing and sea rescue agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union are signed in Moscow.

May 19—In Washington on his way home from Moscow, Ichiro Kono says that Russian leaders are "seriously interested" in restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and that the Russians promise to support Japan's application for U.N. membership once relations are restored.

Middle East Arms

May 3—The Daily Telegraph (London) reports that Czechoslovakia and Syria have concluded an arms agreement providing for shipment to Syria of 100 tanks, 100 armored cars and 25 MIGs.

May 6—Egypt and Jordan issue a joint communiqué announcing agreement on plans to unify and coordinate their armies.

May 12—Twelve more jet planes to complement last month's shipment are released for delivery to Israel from France with the tacit approval of the U.S. The U.S. did not press its priority claim to these planes in its military aid program to NATO.

The United States Defense Department confirms that a consignment of armaments is being shipped to Saudi Arabia.

May 20—The Cairo radio announces that Egypt and Communist Poland have concluded an agreement for Polish arms to be supplied to Egyptian military forces.

May 21—It is announced that Jordan and Lebanon agree to coordinate their defense plans.

May 24—Premier Viliam Siroky reveals that Czechoslovakia and Syria are negotiating a trade agreement and that Syria is "naturally" interested in arms.

May 31—Jordan and Syria announce a military agreement.

NATO Policy

- May 4—At a Paris conference about NATO policy, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposes that the North Atlantic Council study the future role of NATO.
- May 6—U.S. Secretary of State Dulles suggests the creation of a permanent high-level council within NATO to deal with issues that divide the NATO allies.
- May 10—Sir Winston Churchill proposes that the Soviet Union might join NATO "if the recent repudiation of Stalin . . . is sincere . . ."
- May 19—U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Charles E. Bohlen tells Soviet Communist party leader Nikita E. Khrushchev that the Soviet Union "must recognize NATO as a fact of life."
- May 31—Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, supreme military commander of NATO, tells the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there is no justification for reducing U.S. assistance to NATO.

Russian-French Relations

- May 16—Talks open in Moscow between Soviet Premier Bulganin and Foreign Minister Molotov and French Premier Guy Mollet and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau.
- May 19—French Premier Mollet fails to get Soviet support for his government policy in Algeria.

World Trade

- May 15—The world tariff conference ends successfully; it is expected that almost 60 separate bilateral agreements will be signed following the fourth world tariff conference since the end of World War II. Agreements have been reached reducing customs duties on almost \$two billion in trade at 1955 prices.

ALBANIA

- May 18—It is reported that a government bill on social services was recently voted down although Communist Premier Mehmet Shehu tried to force the measure through the Assembly.

ARGENTINA

- May 4—Justice Jorge Vera Vallejo's resignation from the Supreme Court is made

public. He resigns in protest against Provisional President Pedro Aramburu's government decree of May 1 proclaiming that the Constitution written in 1853 and the reforms made in it in 1860, 1868 and 1898 again constitute the law of the land. Judge Vera points out that he was sworn in to administer justice under a Constitution including that of 1949 designed by Juan Perón. Even though he opposes the 1949 Constitution Judge Vera maintains he cannot endorse the unconstitutional manner in which it is abrogated.

- May 19—It is reported that the military junta under General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, Provisional President, has appointed Col. Bernardino Nicomedes Labayru, former chief of staff for the Army's commander in chief, as military attaché to Belgium and the Netherlands. This may be part of a plan to remove rival army officers from Buenos Aires.

AUSTRIA

- May 13—In the first general elections since Austria regained independence a year ago, Chancellor Julius Raab's Austrian People's party defeats the Socialists. The People's party of the moderate Right will have 82 seats in Parliament, instead of its 74. The party lacks an absolute majority by only one vote in the 165-member lower house of Parliament.
- May 14—Chancellor Raab resigns as head of the Socialist-conservative coalition and is commissioned by President Theodore Koerner to form a new cabinet.

BRAZIL

- May 3—By a vote of 96 to 89 the Chamber of Deputies rejects an amendment which would have extended an amnesty to Communist Party Secretary Luis Carlos Prestes and other party members.
- May 6—President Juscelino Kubitschek in a speech declares he is up against a "conspiracy of fatalism" in his endeavor to develop Brazil.
- May 7—Lieut. Gen. Lott, who became Brazil's strong man when he led two coups last November, reveals that he supports a constitutional revision to allow employed illiterates to vote. This would

increase the eligible voters by about 15 million.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

May 1—Three Russian union delegates arrive to join a Chinese Communist union delegation in Sydney to tour several Australian states.

Canada

May 15—C. D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, moves to limit debate in Parliament on the initial stage of the Government's financing of the Trans-Canada pipeline to carry natural gas from the Alberta oil fields to Winnipeg. The motion, sponsored by the Government, passes with a vote of 122 to 73.

May 18—Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent tells the House of Commons that his government will not call for a general election before work is started on the controversial natural gas pipeline.

May 26—A Canadian-Soviet trade treaty, signed in Ottawa February 29, comes into force when instruments of ratification are exchanged in Moscow.

Ceylon

May 4—Ceylon officials inform Britain that British air and naval bases in Ceylon must be removed. Arrangements will have to be made for withdrawal of foreign troops.

May 5—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike says that his party must be firm with Marxist opponents. No members of the Sri Lanka party should appear on platforms with Marxists.

May 18—Prime Minister Bandaranaike presents the text of an agreement for U. S. economic aid to Ceylon to Parliament.

Great Britain

May 1—The Soviet government buys \$5.6 million of textile weaving equipment from a Manchester concern.

May 6—A Communist-led "automation" strike prompts shop stewards in major automotive factories to recommend industry-wide voluntary assessment to support the strike. The strike is not recognized officially by the 10 unions involved.

May 8—The government pledges "close co-operation" with capital and labor to deal with automation problems.

May 9—Leaders of the unions involved in the automation strike ask the strikers to return to work if the company agrees to negotiate.

Answering questions about the Russian charge of espionage in connection with the disappearance of frogman Commander Lionel Crabbe, Prime Minister Anthony Eden declares that Crabbe's activities were not authorized by the government. The Soviet Union charges that the frogman was snooping around a Soviet warship at Portsmouth during the Russian visit to Britain. He is missing and is presumed dead.

May 10—Prime Minister Eden says that Britain will discuss the problem of an embargo on Middle East arms shipments at the U.N.

May 11—More than 11 thousand strikers agree to return to work as the automation strike ends.

Text of a British apology to the Soviet Union for the frogman snooping incident is made public.

May 13—British Communist General Secretary Harry Pollitt resigns and is named party chairman.

May 14—Sir Edwin Plowden, chief of the British Atomic Energy Authority, says that Britain may pass the U. S. in developing commercial atomic power.

With a majority of 78, the government defeats Labor condemnation of its "sterile" policy in Cyprus.

May 17—Minister of Defense Sir Walter Monckton announces that British armed forces are being reduced to 700 thousand men, about 50 thousand below the figure for a year ago.

May 16—Britain informs the U. S. that her trade with Communist China will be widened as the British make "exceptions" to current restrictions against shipping strategic items.

May 20—Hugh Gaitskell, head of the British Labor party, says that fewer controls on Communist trade might help the democratic cause.

May 21—Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd declares that it would be a "breach of faith" for the Government to "cast away those overseas possessions which are vital to our strategic interests." This assertion referred to the vital Crown Colonies of Aden, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Malta and Singapore.

May 21—The Soviet news agency Tass reports that Queen Elizabeth sent a goodwill message to Klement E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in answer to a message he sent her.

May 23—The Atomic Energy Authority announces that the first of two atomic piles at the Calder Hall atomic power station in Cumberland is in use.

India

May 4—The lower house of Parliament passes a bill to give the press freedom to publish defamatory statements made in Parliament.

May 15—The Government presents a 643-page version of India's second Five Year Plan to Parliament.

May 18—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru tells Parliament he does not favor a move to put ceilings on individual incomes. The resolution is withdrawn.

Pakistan

May 14—Prime Minister Mohammed Ali offers Pakistan its first Five Year Plan for economic development, envisaging a total investment of \$2.2 billion.

May 16—A Pakistani official says that the U. S. has asked Pakistan to postpone plans for reopening discussion of the Kashmir issue before the U. N. Security Council.

May 20—President Iskander Mirz dismisses officials of the provincial government of East Pakistan for maladministration. Nearly 45 million Pakistanis face famine there. Administration of the area is taken over by the Central Government under the nominal leadership of Fazlul Huq, provincial governor.

Union of South Africa

May 1—A bill introducing race segregation into South African trade unions receives final parliamentary approval.

May 18—The Supreme Court in Capetown unanimously upholds the removal of forty thousand "Colored" voters (Those of mixed blood) from the white voting register. An act enlarging the Nationalist party majority in the Senate is also found valid. This gives the Government the two-thirds majority it needs for parliamentary action on the Colored voters. The decision may be appealed to the highest court in South Africa, the Appeal Court, by the opposition United party.

May 14—The Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd opens debate on the Tomlinson report on the development of Negro reservations, announcing that the Government accepts the report in principle.

The British Empire

Aden

May 20—130 armed tribesmen are forced to surrender to local security forces by British Air Force Venom jets, as Arabs demonstrate against Lord Lloyd, British Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Colonies.

May 21—It is announced that the report of demonstrations against Lord Lloyd was misfounded. The tribesmen captured on May 20 are said to have come from Saudi Arabia.

Cyprus

May 2—The British House of Commons is told that Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Governor of Cyprus, will soon come to London to discuss the problem of Cyprus.

May 4—It is announced by Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis that Greece plans to appeal to the Human Rights Committee of the Council of Europe against "British atrocities in Cyprus."

May 8—The Governor of Cyprus publishes his decision not to reprieve two young Greek Cypriotes under death sentence. One Cypriote is to die for having killed a Greek Cypriote policeman; the other, for shooting a British businessman although the Britisher lived.

May 9—Stringent security measures are taken to prevent rioting when Michael Karaolis and Andreas Demetriou are hanged.

- Rioting in Athens over the Greek Cypriote hangings take the lives of 3 persons; 124 are injured.
- May 10—The two young Cypriotes are hanged.
- May 11—The Greek Cypriote terrorist organization announces that two British soldiers have been hanged in reprisal for the execution of the Greek Cypriotes.
- May 13—Memorial church services are conducted all over Cyprus for the two Cypriotes hanged on May 10.
- May 18—British authorities ban all shipping in the territorial waters between Latzi and Karavostasi to prevent smuggling of arms and men to terrorists in the Cypriote mountains.
- May 21—It is disclosed in London that Archbishop Makarios and others detained with him recently staged a hunger strike, because of their mistreatment on the Seychelles Islands.
- May 24—Following the killing of a Turkish Cypriote policeman, members of Turkish Cypriote communities stage anti-Greek demonstrations.
- May 28—It is announced that barbed wire will separate the Greek and Turkish sections of Nicosia to prevent further conflict. Curfews were imposed yesterday in much of Cyprus.

Kenya

- May 1—Kenya takes steps to restrict Asian immigration.

Gold Coast

- May 11—British Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd tells the British House of Commons that he has informed the Gold Coast it may have independence as soon as the Gold Coasters vote for it. He stipulates that a general election must be held to decide a constitutional and political dispute before independence can be granted.

Togoland

- May 10—Returns from a plebiscite in British Togoland indicate that Togoland voters want to unite with the Gold Coast.

Singapore

- May 15—Negotiations for Singapore's self-

government collapse in London (for further information see page 53 of this issue).

BURMA

- May 3—Returns from last week's elections show that the Communists have more than tripled their representation in the lower house of Parliament. With 42 seats, the Communist National United Front is the leading opposition party facing Premier U Nu's Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League.
- May 9—It is reported from Rangoon that the government may postpone elections to the upper house of Parliament, now scheduled for May 22, because voter intimidation by Communists is expected.
- May 4—The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development extends a \$19 million loan to Burma for reconstruction of war-devastated port and transport facilities.

CHILE

- May 18—El Siglo, the extreme Leftist paper in Santiago, is closed by the Government.

CHINA

- May 10—The Chinese National Defense Ministry (Taiwan) announces that the Chinese Communists fired 69 shells at Quemoy and that the Nationalist defenders replied.

COLOMBIA

- May 9—The ban on the liberal newspaper El Tiempo is lifted.

EGYPT

- May 13—Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser visits Egyptian forces along the Israeli frontier.
- May 16—British officials announce that six modern airfields built by Britain in the Suez Canal Zone are now in Egyptian hands.
- May 19—Premier Nasser declares that Egypt "is free to buy arms from any place we like and in any quantity we like."
- May 24—Premier Nasser accepts an invitation to visit Communist China soon.
- May 30—Communist China and Egypt establish diplomatic relations as Egypt recognizes the Red China Government.

FRANCE

May 2—Premier Mollet wins a vote of confidence in the National Assembly on a bill to increase old age pensions by higher taxation.

The French Government reverses its position in a statement in which it suggests that disarmament should go hand in hand with German unification.

May 18—French-Soviet talks halt because of a lack of agreement on major issues.

May 23—Pierre Mendes-France, Minister of State without Portfolio, resigns from the Cabinet of the Mollet Government because of a divergence of views on Algerian policy.

May 28—In a treaty with India, France renounces sovereignty over 4 Indian territories which she has held for 140 years.

FRENCH UNION**Algeria**

May 10—The eastern third of Algeria is put under martial law as a result of the continuing French-Algerian conflict.

Tunisia

May 7—Tunisia rejects a French compromise plan on the issue of Tunisia's right to establish diplomatic relations abroad.

May 21—Mr. Azouz, leader of the Tunisian National Party, is shot to death in front of Premier Bourguiba's house.

GERMANY (West)

May 2—West Germany turns down a Soviet offer to enter into a bilateral trade agreement.

May 13—Those parties representing union with West Germany lead in the Saar election.

May 15—The first shipment of U. S. heavy arms equipment is received.

The Adenauer Government expresses its dislike of the Soviet Union's arms cut. West Germany fears that the problem of German reunification will be neglected under the Moscow shift of policy.

May 16—West Germany remains firm on the passage of the military conscription bill before the Parliament adjourns.

May 31—West German proposals to ease barriers with East Germany consist of the

reopening of the frontier, and easing of communication and travel.

GUATEMALA

May 1—Left-wing elements take over the International Labor Day celebration and turn it into an anti-government demonstration.

HUNGARY

May 9—The Budapest radio announces that the Cabinet has decided "to remove technical obstacles on the Western frontier of our country."

May 18—It is reported from Vienna that Matyas Rakosi, Hungarian Communist party chief, has announced that all Social Democrats jailed in Hungary have been released.

INDONESIA

May 2—It is announced that Czechoslovakia has signed a contract to build an enamel products factory for Indonesia at Jakarta.

May 18—In Washington, President Sukarno warns that the defeat of communism should not be the goal of foreign policy.

ISRAEL

May 1—It is revealed that an agricultural settlement has been strategically located about one half mile east of the demilitarized zone on the Beersheba-El Auja road.

May 8—Israel blames the U. S. Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission for not finding Jordan guilty of violating the armistice.

ITALY

May 30—After two days of voting, the pro-Western Christian Democrats and minor Center parties gain strength and the Communists lose support.

Palmiro Togliatti, Italian Communist leader, leaves to meet Marshal Tito in Belgrade.

JAPAN

May 21—The Diet abolishes brothels, as part of an anti-vice campaign.

May 29—The U.S.S.R. obtains official status for its representation in Tokyo.

Japan and North Vietnam sign a trade agreement. This is the sixth agreement between Japan and Communist-dominated countries.

May 31—Socialists forming a human wall prevent the President of the House of Councilors from opening debate on the Government-sponsored educational reform bills.

JORDAN

May 20—Premier Samir el-Rifai and his Government resign.

May 21—Premier Said el Mufti forms a new government and announces that he will request revision of the defense treaty between Jordan and Britain.

May 24—Lieut. Col. Ali Abu Nuwar is appointed Legion commander of the Jordan Arab Legion, succeeding Brig. Gen. Radi Enab, who had succeeded General Glubb in March. Major General Nuwar led the group that forced Glubb's dismissal.

May 25—Maj. Gen. Nuwar announces plans for an enlargement of Jordan's army.

May 26—Defense Minister Mohammed Ali Ajlouni announces plans to merge the Arab Legion with the Jordanian National Guard.

KOREA

May 3—C. Tyler Wood, economic assistance coordinator for South Korea, declares that if Korea must maintain a defense force of 21 divisions it cannot support itself.

May 15—President Syngman Rhee is re-elected for a third four-year term.

May 18—Police enforce a state of national emergency as a recount is ordered in the close race for the vice presidency.

May 20—Dr. John M. Chang, former Premier and Ambassador to the U. S., is elected Vice President of Korea. Dr. Chang leads the Democratic party in opposition to Syngman Rhee's Liberal party.

MOROCCO

May 14—The new Moroccan Army, symbol of Morocco's newly won independence, is reviewed by the Sultan.

May 28—French and Moroccan officials sign a treaty designed to bring the foreign policies of their Governments into harmony. Morocco agrees to be bound by the international treaties which France had made in her name.

NEPAL

May 2—Mahendra Bir Bickram Sha Deva is

blessed with honey and milk and crowned King of the constitutional monarchy of Nepal in the courtroom of the Palace of Hanuman the Monkey God in Katmandu.

NIGERIA

May 2—The House of Assembly of Western Nigeria is dissolved; a general election is scheduled for May 26.

May 20—The government National Patriotic Coalition party's candidate, Ernesto de la Guardia, Jr., appears to have won the presidential election of May 13. He leads the opposition candidate by 2 to 1 with half the vote counted.

PHILIPPINES

May 3—Reparations negotiators approve a draft agreement with Japan, by the terms of which Japan is to pay \$550 million in goods and services payable over 20 years for World War II damages.

May 7—It is announced in Tokyo that the war reparations agreement with the Philippines will include a Japanese economic development loan to the Philippines of \$250 million.

May 9—The Philippines and Japan sign the reparations agreement, making the Philippines a good source of raw material and Japan's best customer for 20 years.

May 18—The Congress adjourns after 100 days in session, with much work unfinished, including passage of tax measures and ratification of the Japanese reparations agreement.

POLAND

May 6—The resignation of Jakub Berman as Deputy Premier and member of the Politburo of the United Workers (Communist) Party comes unexpectedly.

RUMANIA

May 1—It is revealed that Rumania has offered to negotiate settlement of American war claims and claims for property Rumania has nationalized. Nearly half the claims are made by United States oil companies with former property in the Ploesti oil fields.

SPAIN

May 9—The Cortes approves a bill giving military officers and civil service employees

salary increases of from 10 to 88 per cent on their base pay.¹

May 5—A letter is made public from the Primate of the Spanish hierarchy condemning totalitarianism as a method of government.

May 15—Approximately 200 workers are reported to have been arrested as work stoppages continue in Bilbao.

SOMALIA

May 19—Abdullahi Issa is elected first Premier of the Somalia, the East African, Italian-administered trusteeship. The Government is chosen by the first Parliament of Somalia.

THE U. S. S. R.

May 4—The Supreme Soviet decrees an end to special powers of Soviet security organs to deal with sabotage and terrorism.

May 11—A decree of the Supreme Soviet signed by the chairman on April 25 is made public, revoking its strictest labor laws and granting freedom to persons jailed for leaving their jobs without permission.

May 13—A leading member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (M.V.D.) discloses that within 18 months the government will abolish all internment camps.

The Soviet Union declares that NATO is "the main source of international tension."

May 19—A new pension plan is announced providing increased pensions for many Russians.

May 14—The Soviet Union announces plans to reduce its armed forces by 1.2 million before May 1, 1957.

May 18—The U.S.S.R. announces the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia.

May 28—It is disclosed in Moscow that the Soviet Communist party is decreasing its staff 20 to 30 per cent.

May 29—Tass announces that the Supreme Soviet has been called to convene July 11.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

May 23—The Senate unanimously passes a revised farm bill, on which the Joint Conference Committee compromised between the Senate farm bill, passed May 18, and the House's, passed May 3. The new bill provides for a soil bank fund of \$1.2 billion dollars, but does not allow for prepayments to farmers who agree to take land out of production next year.

Other salient features of the bill include: flexible price supports on basic commodities at 75 to 90 per cent of parity; supports on feed grains at 76 per cent parity; current parity price on corn, wheat and peanuts through 1957; national acreage allotments on rice and cotton are set at no less than a 1 per cent reduction for the next two years; a requirement that surplus cotton stocks be sold abroad at the same, or lower, price established by the world market.

May 24—The House of Representatives passes the compromise farm bill.

May 29—President Eisenhower signs the new farm bill despite certain criticisms.

May 31—Secretary Benson announces that payments will begin on the soil bank program to farmers who take land out of production this year. Farmers who plow under crops not too advanced qualify under the program.

Civil Rights

May 10—The Atomic Energy Commission eases its security regulations governing its personnel in an attempt to improve the procedure in security cases so that the rights of an individual are better protected. "Membership in or association with" a subversive organization has been more reasonably defined.

Communism

May 14—The U. S. is seeking to recover social security payments made to Communist leaders on the ground that they are employed by the Russian Government, and not by the U. S. Communist party.

May 25—Federal Judge Levet denies motions of the Communist Party and *The Daily*

Worker to restrain the Internal Revenue Service from collecting back taxes.

Foreign Policy

May 9—The U. S. Government has reversed its former position and plans to support the International Labor Organization Convention condemning the use of forced labor.

Secretary Dulles explains publicly for the first time the reason for the refusal to supply arms to Israel: the U. S. wishes to avoid a proxy war (Arab-Israeli dispute) with Russia and does not wish, therefore, to enter a situation disadvantageous to the prestige of great military powers, which might lead to a global war.

May 17—The President's request for power to transfer at his discretion a maximum of \$2 billion in mutual security funds from one program to another is refused by the House Foreign Affairs Committee considering the foreign aid bill.

The Government blocks an exchange of technical oil drill data with Russia.

May 19—The State Department announces that 21 Army surplus half-track vehicles to be sent to Israel last week were not shipped because the export license issued called for half-track spare parts only.

May 22—Immigration authorities deny admission to Cuba's former president, Carlos Prio Socarras, in the public interest.

Government

May 1—The General Gas Committee denies lobbying on the natural gas bill; the \$119 thousand was spent to provide information. After listening to 2 hours of testimony by an oil company, the committee recesses indefinitely.

Newly registered District of Columbia voters cast their first legalized ballots since 1874.

May 7—Ellis Slack, suspended Justice Department lawyer, asserts that assistant to the Attorney General Newcomb forced him to testify or face prosecution in the federal tax fraud case against Connelly and Caudle, high officials in the Truman Administration.

May 9—Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, will

not seek re-election in November.

Governor Talmadge of Georgia comes forward to press his claim to the vacant Senate seat.

May 10—The Senate Finance Committee, headed by Senator Byrd, votes to eliminate the major features of a Democratic bill to extend social security benefits to women and totally disabled workers.

The Senate approves a \$5 billion bill for federal flood insurance.

May 14—Senator George accepts the appointment as special U. S. ambassador to NATO.

May 15—The Senate receives for confirmation two appointments: that of Walter Dowling as Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and that of J. Graham Parsons as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos.

May 16—The Senate approves a bill providing for the development of hydroelectric power resources at Niagara Falls.

May 17—The House has pledged of enough votes to insure the defeat of the anti-segregation amendment to the bill to provide federal aid for school construction.

May 21—Federal Controller General Campbell accuses the Defense Department of keeping illegally \$400 million in foreign aid funds, which should have been returned to the Treasury.

May 25—The President's housing bill for 35 thousand units yearly for the next two years is defeated by a bill passed in the Senate to provide for 135 thousand units per year.

May 29—Fred Seaton of Nebraska is nominated by the President as Secretary of the Interior to replace Douglas McKay, who is running against Wayne Morse for the Senate.

Judiciary

May 2—It is announced today that the Supreme Court ruled on Monday that a suit for denaturalization must be preceded by an affidavit showing good cause before proceeding.

May 14—The Supreme Court refuses the appeal of 34 states to reconsider its decision on Apr. 2 that the Smith Act supercedes state sedition laws.

May 21—Organized labor wins a victory in

the Supreme Court decision upholding railway union shops. State "right to work" laws do not apply to railways, the federal Railway Labor Act having invalidated them. This ruling does not apply to union shops in other industries.

Military

- May 4—A new series of atom tests in the Pacific begins.
- May 10—The House passes the Administration's arms bill which provides for the strongest peacetime military establishment in U. S. history.
- May 12—Air Force Chief of Staff Twining expresses doubts that the Navy is equipped to carry out long-range bombings with present aircraft carriers.
- May 21—The first airborne hydrogen bomb is exploded in the Pacific.
- May 23—President Eisenhower warns the military that rivalry must not interfere with support of national policy once that policy has been decided.
- May 29—President Eisenhower asks Congress for an additional \$112 million appropriation for the Atomic Energy Commission.
- May 30—Air Force Chief of Staff Twining is to attend Soviet Aviation Day at the invitation of Moscow.

Politics

- May 2—Adlai Stevenson wins over Estes Kefauver in the Alabama and District of Columbia primaries.
- May 6—Senator Lyndon Johnson defeats Governor Shivers to win control of the 56-vote Texas delegation to the Democratic National Convention.
- May 19—The Oregon primary gives Adlai Stevenson sixteen more votes at the Democratic National Convention. President Eisenhower also receives a heavy vote. "mate issue" in the election campaign.
- May 27—Senator Wiley, foremost midwestern supporter of the Administration's foreign policy, is defeated at the Wisconsin Republican Convention by isolationist McCarthyites.
- May 29—Adlai Stevenson, in a narrow victory over Estes Kefauver, wins 22 of the 28 seats to the Democratic National Convention in the Florida primary.

Important New Books on Asia

INDONESIAN SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. By W. F. Wertheim. This scholarly and thought-provoking appraisal of long-term social changes in Indonesia throws a flood of light on the forms which Indonesian nationalism has assumed and on other aspects of present-day Indonesia. *Summer 1956. 300 pp. \$5.00*

POPULATION GROWTH AND LEVELS OF CONSUMPTION. With Special Reference to Countries in Asia. By Horace Belshaw. *August 1956. 256 pp. \$4.50*

THE VIET MINH REGIME. By Bernard B. Fall. A completely revised and greatly expanded edition of Dr. Fall's earlier study on the political and military administration of the Communist regime in North Vietnam. Charts, maps, bibliography. *July 1956. 200 pp. mimeo. \$2.50*

KOREA'S HERITAGE: A REGIONAL AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY. By Shannon McCune. A valuable new study on Korean geography, historical development, political pattern and economy. Published by the Charles E. Tuttle Co. *August 1956. 237 pp. \$5.00*

THE CHINESE IN MODERN MALAYA. By Victor Purcell. *July 1956. 63 pp. paper, \$1.00*

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA. With Special Reference to Indochina, 1950-55. *1955. mimeo. 81 pp. \$1.25*

INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
One East 54th Street, New York 22, N. Y.

Current History REPORTS on...

THE SOVIET UNION

January, 1956

Is there actually a "New Look" inside the Soviet Union? What does history teach us about changing Soviet policy? Articles discuss: Russia After Stalin, Soviet Industry and the New Look, Soviet Agriculture and the New Look, Soviet Education's New Look, Soviet Society Today, The Dialectic of Co-existence and The Russians Look Eastward.

INDIA

February, 1956

As leader of the Third Force in world politics, India commands the interest of all thinking Americans. Here, thoughtful Indians describe India's domestic problems: Government, Agriculture, Industry, Education and Communalism. American specialists analyze India's Outlook on Foreign Affairs and the British Heritage.

GERMANY

April, 1956

Germany has risen from defeat to a position of tremendous power and influence in Europe. Here, specialists consider: reunification, Bonn's foreign policy, German nationalism, prosperity at Bonn, leadership at Bonn, the Saar and the East German Republic.

AFRICA

May, 1956

The rapid economic and political development of the African nations may in time shift the balance of power in the world. In this issue, articles deal with: Southern Africa in a World Setting, the Union of South Africa, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, the African Federation and Uganda.

THE MIDDLE EAST

June, 1956

Here is a careful, objective analysis of: the political effects of Islam; the problem of Israel; Nationalism in the Middle East; the effects of British rule there; the problem of Oil; the Peasant and Land Reform.

THE FAR EAST

July, 1956

What can we realistically expect of our Asiatic allies and friends? How strong are the nations of Asia and Southeast Asia? In six provocative studies, specialists discuss: the Pacific security system and the SEATO pact; the dilemma of the two Chinas; Japan; Vietnam; Indonesia; and the Republic of Korea.

Current History • 108 Walnut Street • Philadelphia 6, Pa.

A McGRAW-HILL *feature . . .*

for your history courses

THE AMERICAN STORY

McGraw-Hill
Series in History

Here is a vivid re-creation of the American story—a full and fascinating description of American life, its culture, its relationship with the rest of the world, and the personalities who have played a significant role in the growth of the United States since its discovery.

by **ROBERT E. RIEGEL**
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

DAVID F. LONG
UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

VOLUME I YOUTH

528 pages \$6.00

Volume I: *Youth* covers the period from early exploration to 1877. It carries the American story through the political reconstruction following the Civil War. The Colonial period, in a relatively brief treatment, presents background material for later developments. The entire volume achieves a balanced narrative, showing the development of a distinctive American culture, with its various complex inter-relationships.

VOLUME II MATURITY

544 pages \$6.00

Volume II: *Maturity* continues the national story of the United States from 1877 to the present, but with some earlier connections, since social, economic, and intellectual patterns are even more difficult to divide into neat chronological packages than are the political and diplomatic trends. The trends are the development of an urban, high-speed civilization and of a world of mass communication and leadership in which, however, many cross-currents clearly exist.

Ready for fall classes . . .

WORKBOOKS. . . . A set of two, each for individual volumes.

INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL . . . NOW FREE to instructors.

★ SEND FOR COPIES OF

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY, INC.
330 WEST 42nd STREET • NEW YORK 36, N. Y.